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Abstract 
As phishing attacks become increasingly common and sophisticated, anti-phishing 
training must extend beyond teaching individuals about cues and rules associated with 
phishing. Specifically, training methods that teach individuals effective allocation of 
time and attentional resources to the nature and context of emails should be examined, 
as well as strategies for improving skill retention from training. Thus, the present study 
compared the effectiveness of rule-based and mindfulness training, as well as the 
influence of overlearning on training, on two tests of skill retention on phishing 
susceptibility (i.e., email identification tests and mock phishing attack tests). 
Participants were 453 university undergraduates who received training and practice and 
then were tested immediately following training using an email identification test. 
Participants were then sent mock phishing emails 1 week and 8 weeks after training, as 
well as an additional email identification test 10 weeks after training. Results showed 
that individuals who received mindfulness training were significantly better at 
discriminating between legitimate and phishing emails, less susceptible to phishing 
attacks, and more cautious of phishing compared to those who received rule-based 
training. However, the discriminability effect of mindfulness training was subject to a 
similar rate of skill decay as rule-based training. Although training did not differ as a 
function of overlearning, individuals who received 100% overlearning were 
significantly less susceptible to phishing attacks and more cautious of phishing 
compared to those who did not receive overlearning. Results are discussed regarding 
implications for implementing effective anti-phishing training to protect individuals and 
their respective organizations and institutions.
1 
Introduction 
According to a 2016 report by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (McCabe, 
2016), successful phishing attacks have increased by 270% since January 2015, which 
has resulted in an estimated 2.3 billion dollars in annual losses related to fraud, theft, 
damages to reputation, regulatory violations, and loss of intellectual property. To help 
combat these attacks, several countermeasures have been suggested to assist 
organizations and individuals in defending themselves, some of which include 
preventing messages from reaching users through email filters and website blockings, 
providing better Web interfaces and tools that warn users of suspicious websites, and 
training users on how to identify phishing emails and websites (Hong, 2012; 
Kumaraguru et al., 2007a). Although the first two strategies are ideal for protecting 
users against phishing attacks as a first line of defense, these technological mechanisms 
are not always foolproof and can be overcome as phishers become more sophisticated in 
their attack methods. If these attacks manage to bypass automated anti-phishing tools or 
systems in place and reach individuals’ email inboxes, it is ultimately up to individuals 
to make the decision as to how they will respond. Thus, it is imperative to educate users 
on the dangers of phishing attacks and how to avoid the negative consequences.  
Research has shown that anti-phishing training can increase individuals’ 
capability to identify phishing emails and can reduce their susceptibility to phishing 
(Karumbaiah, Wright, Durcikova, & Jensen, 2016; Kumaraguru et al., 2007b, 2010; 
Sheng, Holbrook, Kumaraguru, Cranor, & Downs, 2010). However, the majority of 
previous anti-phishing training methods have focused on educating individuals on 
specific cues or signals associated with phishing emails through a rule-based approach, 
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which may become obsolete as phishing attacks evolve. Relying upon a fixed set of 
guidelines may not be effective across all contexts and may still leave individuals 
susceptible to phishing attacks because emails are not critically evaluated and done so 
out of habit (Vishwanath, Herath, Chen, Wang, & Rao, 2011). Thus, there is a need to 
examine alternative anti-phishing training methods that train individuals to allocate 
adequate attention and time to their emails and the context in which they are received.  
In addition, few studies have examined the extent to which the skills trained 
during anti-phishing training are retained over an extended period of time, with most 
studies examining retention intervals that are less than 1 month. Although it is fairly 
established that skill retention decreases as time increases (Arthur, Bennett, Stanush, & 
McNelly, 1998; Wang, Day, Kowollik, Schuelke, & Hughes, 2013), the phishing 
literature has not thoroughly investigated the rate in which learning from anti-phishing 
training decays across time and the point in which these training effects diminish. 
Because constant refresher courses cost organizations time and money, it is necessary 
that anti-phishing training programs promote learning that is retained for longer periods 
of time. In this vein, overlearning has been found to be an effective training strategy in 
increasing retention by providing practice opportunities for individuals that go beyond 
the point of initial learning (Driskell, Willis, & Copper, 1992). Even so, studies of 
overlearning have generally found that these benefits quickly diminish over time and 
are only beneficial for short-term retention. However, given that the majority of 
overlearning research involves laboratory studies with relatively simple tasks (e.g., 
verbal recall tasks) and short retention intervals, it is difficult to make clear conclusions 
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about retention rates of overlearning on training material that is more relevant and 
practical to real-world situations.  
Thus, there were two goals of the present study. First, I was interested in 
comparing the effectiveness of two anti-phishing training methods: rule-based training 
and mindfulness training. In contrast to rule-based training that has constituted the 
majority of anti-phishing training, anti-phishing training that incorporates components 
from mindfulness training may be particularly beneficial in helping individuals identify 
phishing emails (Baer, Smith, & Allen, 2004; Brown, Ryan, & Creswell, 2007; Jensen, 
Dinger, Wright, & Thatcher, 2017). In the context of phishing, mindfulness training 
teaches individuals to devote their attention and effort to the context in which the 
messages are received. By first forestalling judgment and then reflecting upon the 
underlying requests or motives associated with email messages, individuals can make 
more careful and detailed evaluations that could prevent them from falling for a 
phishing attack. Although preliminary research on mindfulness training related to 
phishing has shown promising results in reducing phishing susceptibility, further 
research is needed to examine its effectiveness in terms of long-term retention (Jensen 
et al., 2017). For the present study, to evaluate training effectiveness, skill retention was 
measured not only in regards to performance on explicit email identification tests at the 
conclusion of training (i.e., maximal performance) but also on tests of vulnerability to 
mock phishing attacks outside the training environment (i.e., typical performance). In 
general, when left to their own accord, individuals are much more vulnerable to 
phishing when they are in their everyday environments. Thus, assessing skill retention 
through these two types of tests provided a clearer picture of how individuals may differ 
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in their capability to detect phishing in a more controlled setting versus a real-world 
setting.  
Second, I was interested in examining the influence of overlearning on these two 
types of anti-phishing training in relation to skill retention. To my knowledge, there 
have been no studies that have examined overlearning through the lens of anti-phishing 
training, let alone compared the effectiveness of overlearning on different training 
methods within the same study. Although overlearning should result in better skill 
retention in identifying and being less susceptible to phishing emails, it may also result 
in more automatic processing of messages and consequently less generalizability. This 
may be detrimental in the context of phishing because evaluating email messages 
requires conscious effort as no two phishing emails are identical. In other words, as 
individuals become more familiar and receive more exposure to phishing emails, 
evaluating these messages may become habitual and done in a thoughtless manner. 
Thus, examining overlearning in the context of anti-phishing training will provide 
insight as to whether it would be beneficial in protecting individuals in the long term.  
Phishing 
According to the Anti-Phishing Working Group, phishing is defined as “a 
criminal mechanism employing both social engineering and technical subterfuge to steal 
consumers’ personal identity data and financial account credentials” (APWG, 2017; p. 
2). Social engineering refers to using influence and persuasion tactics to deceive 
individuals into revealing confidential information on counterfeit websites, whereas 
technical subterfuge refers to planting malware onto individuals’ computers and 
systems to steal their information directly (APWG, 2017; Mitnick & Simon, 2002). 
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Phishing attacks are most commonly initiated through email but may also be conducted 
through instant messaging or online games. Over the course of 12 years, phishing has 
increased by an overwhelming 5,753%, with an average of 92,564 phishing attacks per 
month (APWG, 2017). In this vein, studies have shown that individuals are generally 
very susceptible to phishing attacks. Individuals were often unable to distinguish 
between legitimate and phishing websites between 40% and 80% of the time (Abbasi, 
Zahedi, & Chen, 2012; Dhamija, Tygar, & Herst, 2006; Grazioli and Jarvenpaa, 2000; 
Herzberg and Jbara, 2008). In addition, over 70% of participants engaged with a 
phishing website by making purchases and providing sensitive information (Grazioli 
and Jarvenpaa, 2000; Jagatic, Johnson, Jakobsson, & Menczer, 2007). Thus, without 
any technological decision-making aids or training available prior to encountering these 
attacks, individuals are at serious risk of falling for phishing attacks. 
Phishing attacks consist of three major phases: the bait (also referred to as lure), 
the hook, and the catch (Hong, 2012; Myers, 2007). In the bait phase, phishers send 
users a seemingly legitimate email message that requires their attention. These email 
messages are often distributed to a large number of individuals with the hopes that a 
small subset of recipients will fall victim to their attack. The most common requests ask 
users to click on a Uniform Resource Locator (URL) link embedded in the email 
message, which redirects them to a website that is controlled by the phisher and used to 
obtain confidential information from users. Phishers may also utilize other methods of 
attack such as asking users to open or download an attachment that contains malware or 
reply to an email with sensitive or confidential information. In the hook phase, users 
take action on the email by either clicking on the link, downloading the attachment, or 
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replying to the email. When users click on links, they are redirected to a website that 
imitates the appearance of the entity being falsely portrayed. For example, if a phisher is 
attempting to steal bank account information, the layout of the phishing website may 
look very similar, if not identical, to the actual banking website to convince users of its 
legitimacy. Finally, in the catch phase, phishers make use of the information they 
collect from their victims by monetizing the stolen information through activities such 
as fraud or identity theft. Depending on what the phishers are targeting, users may not 
be aware that their information has been compromised until an extended period of time 
has passed. 
Phishing is often referred to as a type of semantic attack, which are computer-
based attacks that take advantage of the way in which humans interact with computers 
and interpret messages (Downs, Holbrook, & Cranor, 2006). Thus, phishers rely upon 
different technical and social tactics to make their emails more credible and persuade 
users to comply to their requests. Commonly used technical tactics include using 
legitimate trademarks, logos, and images to convince users that the email sender comes 
from the actual party or institution, spoofing emails (e.g., forging sender email 
addresses to conceal the identity of the phisher), and hiding, encoding, and matching 
links to make the phishing websites appear official and legitimate (Myers, 2007). By 
mimicking the content and layout of legitimate emails and websites, phishers aim to not 
raise suspicion in users.  
 In addition to making emails and phishing websites appear more legitimate, 
phishers also utilize social engineering tactics to make users more willing and 
enthusiastic about providing their information. Specifically, phishers use a variety of 
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influence techniques, some of which include liking, reciprocity, social proof, 
consistency, authority, and scarcity (Cialdini, 2009; Wright, Jensen, Thatcher, Dinger, 
& Marett, 2014). Liking refers to gaining compliance through attempts of earning 
recipients’ trust or friendship through praising or emphasizing similarities. Reciprocity 
refers to making recipients believe they need to repay or owe a favor to the sender in 
exchange for any services the senders are falsely providing. Social proof refers to 
making recipients believe that others have already performed the requested action, 
which is indicated to be the “correct” behavior or response. Consistency refers to taking 
advantage of individuals’ desire to maintain consistency in their actions through 
describing a false prior commitment made by recipients and then making a request that 
is consistent with the commitment. Authority refers to referencing or impersonating 
figures of higher experience, knowledge, or power with hopes that recipients will obey 
their requests. Scarcity refers to creating a sense of urgency and the illusion that 
recipients will lose resources if they do not take action. Because these influence 
techniques are not mutually exclusive, phishers often use them in conjunction with one 
another. In addition, these social tactics are often used in combination with technical 
tactics to reinforce the legitimacy of the emails. 
Combating Phishing Attacks 
 In general, three main strategies have been suggested to help users and 
organizations protect themselves from phishing attacks (Hong, 2012; Kumaraguru et al., 
2007a). First, phishing attacks can be prevented from even reaching users. For example, 
filtering phishing emails, blocking fake websites, and forcibly taking down phishing 
websites essentially make phishing non-existent to the user by removing any potential 
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threats before they appear to the user. Second, phishing attacks can be combatted by 
providing users with better interfaces for their Web browsers and email clients. For 
example, more advanced warning notifications and identification markers on legitimate 
websites can help users detect phishing attacks more easily. In addition, more advanced 
login systems that require multiple forms of user identification make it more difficult 
for phishers to hack into these systems.  
Although these two strategies provide an effective first line of defense, they are 
only effective if the technology is error-free and users accept the recommendations 
made by the warning systems. However, studies have shown that these instances are 
often not the case. For example, Zhang, Egelman, Cranor, and Hong (2006) evaluated 
the performance of 10 popular anti-phishing tools in detecting 200 verified phishing 
URLs and found that only one tool was able to identify more than 90% of the URLs 
correctly. This tool, however, also incorrectly identified 42% of legitimate URLs as 
phishing URLs. In addition, Abbasi, Zahedi, and Kaza (2012) found that despite being 
provided an anti-phishing tool that was 90% accurate, individuals still ignored warnings 
and went against anti-phishing tool recommendations by engaging with phishing 
websites 21% to 25% of the time.  
It is also important to remember that as anti-phishing technology continues to 
advance, phishing attacks are also advancing. In other words, phishers are learning 
ways to override current systems and outsmart users through more advanced attack 
methods. For example, personalized phishing attacks known as spear phishing are 
particularly difficult to detect (Hong, 2012; Myers, 2007). Instead of mass distributing 
phishing emails with the hopes that some individuals will fall for the bait, spear 
9 
phishing takes into account users’ contexts when creating messages, such as only 
sending bank-related phishing emails to users that have accounts with the referenced 
bank. 
The examples above demonstrate the need for alternative anti-phishing 
strategies because an overreliance on these technology-based strategies may ultimately 
be detrimental to users and leave them more vulnerable to phishing attacks. Thus, the 
third strategy for combating phishing attacks involves training users about what 
phishing is and how to identify phishing emails. Educating individuals about security in 
general, however, is a difficult task. In fact, some security experts have argued that user 
education does not work and is a waste of time and money because individuals are not 
motivated to read about security and do not take the necessary time to educate 
themselves (Evers, 2006; Nielsen, 2004). For example, sending security notices alone 
are not an effective method for educating individuals about the dangers of phishing and 
other types of semantic attacks because individuals are often overconfident in their 
capability to protect themselves from these types of attacks; thus, they disregard any 
security-related information because it is repetitive or already known (Kumaraguru et 
al., 2007b). In addition, security is often a secondary task for most individuals. For 
example, individuals may be solely concerned with completing a task (e.g., checking 
and responding to emails) and not the risks that are associated while working on the 
task. Challenges also arise where user education may make individuals overly cautious 
when opening and acting upon their emails, making them more likely to mistake non-
threats as threats (e.g., making false positives) that could negatively impact work 
productivity (Kumaraguru et al., 2010; Sheng et al., 2010).  
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Despite these arguments, user security education remains an important 
component of combating against phishing attacks because “as technology increases and 
becomes more prevalent, the human factor remains the most viable target for would-be 
attackers” (Purkait, 2012; p. 402). Wright and Marett (2010) found that individuals who 
are lower on experiential factors such as computer self-efficacy, Web experience, and 
security knowledge are more susceptible to phishing attacks and conclude that 
“experience and training appear to be the most effective tools for guarding against 
phishing” (p. 289). In addition, anti-phishing training may be especially important for 
individuals between the ages of 18 to 25, who have been found to be the most 
vulnerable age group due to their lower levels of formal education, higher risk 
propensity, and less exposure to training materials (Kumaraguru et al., 2009; Sheng et 
al., 2010). Thus, anti-phishing training is becoming a necessity for high school and 
college students, particularly those who are entering the workforce and are likely to 
encounter more frequent phishing emails that can be detrimental to both themselves and 
their respective organizations.  
Anti-Phishing Training 
In general, research has shown that anti-phishing training can be effective in 
reducing phishing susceptibility and helping individuals distinguish between legitimate 
and phishing emails. For example, Sheng et al. (2007) designed an online game called 
Anti-Phishing Phil to train individuals on how to identify phishing URLs, search for 
cues in web browsers, and use search engines to find legitimate websites. Their findings 
showed that compared to those who were asked to read anti-phishing training materials 
from existing online resources, individuals who played Anti-Phishing Phil were 
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significantly better at distinguishing legitimate websites from phishing websites on a 
criterion task (i.e., website identification task) completed immediately after training. 
Karumbaiah et al. (2016) found that providing individuals with general video training 
regarding how to identify phishing messages led to a 44% reduction in individuals’ 
likelihood to click on links embedded in phishing emails on a criterion task (i.e., 
hypothetical email management task) completed 10 days after training. In addition, 
Kumaraguru et al. (2007b) designed an embedded anti-phishing training system called 
PhishGuru that sends fake phishing emails to test individuals and provides immediate 
training if individuals fall for a phishing email by clicking on a link. Compared to 
individuals who were emailed phishing information separately to read, individuals who 
received embedded training had greater motivation to learn and were better at 
identifying phishing emails both similar and different from the ones presented during 
training 1 week from the conclusion of training. Sheng et al. (2010) evaluated the 
effectiveness of these various anti-phishing training materials (e.g., Anti-Phishing Phil, 
PhishGuru, and web-based training materials) and found that these materials led to a 
40% reduction in individuals’ tendencies to enter their personal information into 
phishing websites on a criterion task (i.e., hypothetical email roleplay task) completed 
immediately after training. However, despite this reduction after training, 28% of 
individuals still fell for the phishing emails during the roleplay task, which implies the 
need for other types of anti-phishing training methods.  
Rule-Based Training 
As a whole, the majority of existing anti-phishing training methods incorporate 
what can be referred to as rule-based training (Jensen et al., 2017). Rule-based training 
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teaches individuals how to apply a set of specific guidelines when evaluating emails, 
such as not clicking on embedded email links from unknown senders or not replying to 
emails that request confidential information. In addition, rule-based training teaches 
individuals about specific cues that are likely to allude to a message being phishing, 
such as requests for urgent action or suspicious URLs (Downs et al., 2006). Although 
having a list of predetermined guidelines to follow and cues to be on the look out for 
can help individuals recognize phishing emails more quickly and more effectively, rule-
based training works under the assumption that all phishing emails are similar and do 
not change over time. As phishing attacks evolve and phishers begin developing 
messages that are much more complex, the same rules and cues once established in the 
past may become obsolete, limiting the effectiveness of this type of training. For 
example, spear phishing deviates from the recommendation of not responding to 
unknown senders by sending individuals customized email messages that appear to 
come from reputable and known senders (Downs et al., 2006; Myers, 2007).    
In addition, these issues are compounded as the rules and cues learned are 
consistently used and reinforced into an email management routine. By teaching 
individuals to rely upon simple rules and cues, rule-based training promotes the use of 
peripheral route processing (also known as System 1 thinking) when evaluating emails, 
which will likely lead to decisions that are made quickly and carelessly (Petty & 
Cacioppo, 1986; Stanovich & West, 2000; Vishwanath et al., 2011). By not critically 
evaluating emails and doing so out of habit, users are much more vulnerable to phishing 
attacks. In this vein, some phishing influence tactics (e.g., liking, scarcity, social proof, 
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reciprocity) are especially effective because they exploit users’ tendencies to process 
emails automatically (Wright et al., 2014).  
Mindfulness Training 
As an alternative to rule-based training, individuals need to be trained to 
evaluate emails through central route processing (also known as System 2 thinking), 
which involves the deliberate and conscious evaluation of information (Petty & 
Cacioppo, 1986; Stanovich & West, 2000). By allocating the necessary time and 
attention to critically evaluating emails, individuals should be able to better protect 
themselves from phishing attacks. In this vein, Wright et al. (2014) recommended that 
future researchers should “investigate methods for encouraging System 2 evaluation, 
especially when processing requests for private information” (p. 396). Accordingly, 
anti-phishing training methods that incorporate elements from mindfulness training may 
be particularly useful for reducing phishing susceptibility.  
Mindfulness is defined as “a receptive attention to and awareness of present 
events and experience” (Brown et al., 2007; p. 212). Although known for its relevance 
in the clinical psychology literature in treating individuals with behavioral or emotional 
disorders, these concepts and skills taught in mindfulness training have also been 
applied to other contexts (e.g., the workplace) to help individuals with their physical 
and mental well-being (Baer, 2003; Grossman, Niemann, Schmidt, & Walach, 2004; 
Hulsheger, Alberts, Feinholdt, & Lang, 2012). Baer et al. (2004) outline four skills that 
are central to mindfulness training: 1) observing; 2) describing; 3) acting with 
awareness; and 4) accepting (or allowing) without judgment. Observing refers to being 
present-oriented by noticing and paying attention to surrounding stimuli. Describing 
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refers to applying non-judgmental labels to observations. Acting with awareness refers 
to engaging in an activity with undivided attention and focusing on one specific thing at 
a time. Accepting without judgment refers to being non-evaluative of one’s present 
experience or not responding to a situation through an automatic, impulsive manner. 
Using these components of mindfulness training, Jensen et al. (2017) applied 
mindfulness to the context of anti-phishing training to help individuals better allocate 
and direct their attention to the evaluation of emails through several steps. First, 
individuals are taught to attend to the context in which they receive emails. By taking a 
broader perspective and examining the overall purpose and consequences of the email, 
rather than the specific content, individuals can get a better understanding of how to 
approach the situation. In this vein, individuals may be so concerned with quickly 
fulfilling the request made in the email that they do not recognize that the request itself 
may be unusual. Second, individuals are taught to fully engage and direct their attention 
to evaluating emails. By consciously putting in effort to reading and understanding 
emails, individuals can be more cautious to suspicious requests, particularly during time 
constraints when quick information processing is likely to occur. Finally, individuals 
are taught to withhold any judgments of emails until they have gathered sufficient 
evidence on how to respond. Instead of immediately labeling an email as either 
legitimate or phishing, individuals should take it upon themselves to investigate the 
situation further and even consider getting confirmation from a trusted third party. As a 
preliminary investigation, Jensen et al. (2017) compared the effectiveness of rule-based 
training and mindfulness training and found that 7.5% of individuals who received 
mindfulness training responded to a mock phishing attack 10 days after training, 
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compared to 13.4% of individuals who received rule-based training (p = .04). Overall, 
training individuals to be more mindful and conscious in their email evaluation appears 
to be an important strategy for protecting individuals from phishing attacks, and further 
research is needed to examine the effectiveness of mindfulness training over a longer 
period of time.  
Overlearning 
Although previous studies have demonstrated the effectiveness of anti-phishing 
training, very few studies have examined how the knowledge and skills gained during 
training are retained over time. In addition, the studies that have examined skill 
retention in the phishing context (e.g., Alnajim & Munro, 2009; Kumaraguru et al., 
2007b; Kumaraguru et al., 2009; Mayhorn & Nyeste, 2012) have only included short 
retention intervals that are less than 1 month. Thus, more research is needed that 
examines how learning from anti-phishing training decays over time and what training 
methods can help individuals retain these skills over longer periods of time. To this end, 
overlearning may be a particularly useful training strategy to improve skill retention. 
Overlearning is defined as “the deliberate overtraining of a task past a set 
criterion” (Driskell, Willis, & Copper, 1992, p. 615). Overlearning differs from 
distributed practice such that the continuation of practice occurs immediately after 
reaching the initial level of learning and is not delayed until a subsequent learning 
session. Overlearning can benefit retention through several mechanisms, some of which 
include strengthening the bonds between stimulus and response, reducing cognitive 
demand by enhancing automaticity, and providing trainees with further practice and 
feedback on the correctness of responses (Arthur et al., 1998; Wang et al., 2013). 
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Additionally, individuals who overlearn tasks may also be more resistant to stress-
related effects (e.g., narrowed attention) during performance because their tasks become 
automated and require less active attentional capacity (Driskell & Johnston, 1998). 
Researchers (e.g., Rohrer et al. 2005; Schendel & Hagman, 1982) have also noted the 
importance of overlearning when there are severe consequences from forgetting and 
incorrectly performing a task, particularly those that are infrequently practiced and used 
only in emergency or crisis situations.  
In general, research has consistently shown that overlearning is an effective 
training technique for retention and that “the importance of continuing practice beyond 
the point in time where some…criterion is reached cannot be overemphasized” (Fitts, 
1965, p. 195). Driskell et al.’s (1992) meta-analytic results indicated a moderate effect 
of overlearning on retention, with greater degrees of overlearning resulting in greater 
retention. The authors concluded that with even just 50% overlearning, individuals can 
expect small improvements in retention. However, the degree of overlearning that is 
needed may ultimately depend on the type of task being performed. For example, 
Schendel and Hagman (1982) found that 100% overlearning was optimal for retention 
on a task involving the assembly of a machine gun, whereas Krueger (1930) found that 
retention benefits were no longer evident once overlearning exceeded 150% on a maze 
tracing task. Despite these disagreements, it is well-established that those who receive 
overlearning will have greater retention compared to those who do not receive 
overlearning (Krueger, 1929; Juola, 1967; Melnick, 1971; Postman, 1963). Although it 
has been argued that overlearning may cost more resources through extended training 
beyond initial proficiency, this cost may be offset by lower costs associated with 
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subsequent retraining or refresher training. For example, Schendel and Hagman (1982) 
found that after an 8-week non-use interval, participants who received overlearning 
required 22% fewer trials to retrain to the criterion level than participants who did not 
receive overlearning. 
Methodological Issues with Studies of Overlearning 
Despite the vast number of studies supporting overlearning as an effective 
training strategy for bolstering retention, there are many methodological issues that 
challenge these findings and need to be addressed, some of which include how the 
criterion is defined and operationalized, the optimal retention interval, and the types of 
tasks examined. In many studies (e.g., Krueger, 1929; Postman, 1963; Schendel & 
Hagman, 1982), the criterion was operationally defined as achieving one errorless trial 
on a task, and the number of overlearning trials provided was determined by the number 
of trials it took participants to reach the criterion. For example, if it takes a participant 
10 trials to reach one errorless trial on a task, 100% overlearning consisted of 10 
additional trials. If it takes a different participant 20 trials to reach this criterion, 100% 
overlearning would consist of an additional 20 trials. Although this procedure ensures 
that all participants receive the precise level of initial learning (e.g., all participants 
actually reach the set criterion), these results are confounded by the overall amount of 
practice individuals receive (Rohrer et al., 2005). For example, participants who take 
longer to reach the criterion (e.g., 20 trials) may ultimately perform better on a retention 
task than those who reach the criterion much more quickly (e.g., 10 trials) simply due to 
the sheer amount of additional practice they are receiving.  
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To account for these issues, overlearning has also been manipulated through a 
duration-based approach where the duration of the study or the number of learning trials 
for each degree of learning is pre-determined. This approach ensures that all 
participants in the same learning condition receive an equal amount of learning trials or 
practice. However, it may difficult to establish an amount of practice that produces the 
desired degree of initial learning. Thus, with the duration-based approach, it is 
important for researchers to conduct pilot testing on a task to establish an appropriate 
amount of learning trials that should be provided. For example, Mandler (1954) 
conducted preliminary experiments to establish the smallest amount of training needed 
and set the criterion to 10 errorless trials based upon the extreme variability of task 
performance with training of less than 10 errorless trials. Similarly, Rohrer et al. (2005) 
pre-determined the number of learning trials in their study, which was set to five or 20 
(referred to as low or high learning conditions, respectively). In addition, with a 
duration-based approach, it is possible for some participants to never reach an initial 
level of learning. Rohrer et al. (2005) stated that including these individuals in analyses 
may result in observed differences that overestimate the benefits of overlearning. Thus, 
they took into account this confound by conducting two separate sets of analyses, one 
comparing those in the low and high learning conditions and another further 
distinguishing these two learning groups by comparing those who had exceeded the 
criterion multiple times (referred to as the true high learners) and those who never 
reached the criterion (referred to as the true low learners).  
In terms of retention intervals (i.e., the length of time after overlearning when 
trainees are tested again), Driskell et al. (1992) found that the benefits of overlearning 
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decreased by one half after 19 days and was found to disappear overall after a 5- to 6-
week interval. Based on these findings, it was recommended that refresher trainings or 
courses be provided after approximately 3 weeks. However, out of the 15 studies 
included in Driskell et al.’s (1992) meta-analysis, only five studies included retention 
intervals greater than 1 week and only one greater than 28 days. In general, very few 
overlearning studies have examined retention intervals that exceed 1 month. Thus, the 
question left unanswered is whether overlearning is only beneficial for short-term 
retention. In this vein, Rohrer et al. (2005) examined retention intervals of 1, 3, and 9 
weeks for a verbal recall task and found that although overlearning led to significantly 
greater recall, retention declined at a greater rate and by a greater proportion for those 
who underwent overlearning compared to those who did not receive overlearning. In 
other words, although overlearning is clearly advantageous after a short retention 
interval, the gains in retention may quickly diminish and both groups may ultimately be 
similar in terms of their recall or accuracy after an extended period of time has passed. 
Thus, further research is needed to determine whether the benefits of overlearning also 
apply to long-term retention.  
In addition, with the exception of a few studies that have trained real-world or 
practical skills such as communication tactics or job-relevant skills (e.g., Kratzig, 2016; 
Lopez, 1980; Schendel & Hagman, 1982), the majority of overlearning studies have 
examined simple laboratory tasks such as verbal recall tasks. As stated by Driskell et al. 
(1992), “motivation certainly plays a role in training effectiveness…subjects will be 
more motivated to learn in studies that use relevant real-world tasks…than in studies 
that use laboratory tasks” (p. 621). Thus, participants in these studies may find no 
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relevance or importance to the tasks they are practicing, which may influence how well 
learning is retained. Further research should examine how overlearning influences 
retention with more complex tasks. 
Hypotheses and Research Questions 
The proposed study had two goals. The first goal of the study was to compare 
the effectiveness of rule-based and mindfulness training. To this aim, training 
effectiveness was measured in relation to skill retention on the performance of two 
different tests of phishing susceptibility: 1) an email identification test similar to their 
laboratory training task and 2) mock phishing attacks in their everyday (i.e., real-world) 
email use. Using these two tests was important due to the fact that they occur in 
different contexts. For example, identifying legitimate/phishing emails when one is 
provided with a predetermined set to solely focus on is very different from identifying 
legitimate/phishing emails when balancing other on-going demands. Thus, measuring 
retention through these two types of tests provided greater insight as to how well 
individuals learned to identify phishing emails versus their actual vulnerability to them 
in their everyday environment.  
Consistent with previous studies that have compared anti-phishing training to a 
no training control condition (e.g., Kumaraguru et al., 2007b; Sheng et al., 2010), rule-
based training should lead to better identification of phishing emails and less 
vulnerability to phishing attacks by providing individuals with a list of rules and cues 
commonly associated with phishing emails to work through when they are evaluating 
email messages. As mentioned previously, however, the effectiveness of rule-based 
training may be limited such that it constrains individuals from making decisions 
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outside of this predetermined list and turns the evaluation of emails into an automatic 
process. In this way, evaluating emails becomes more of a habit rather than a conscious 
task; thus, rule-based training still leaves individuals vulnerable to real phishing attacks 
(Vishwanath et al., 2011; Wright et al., 2014). On the other hand, mindfulness training 
can address these issues by promoting more systematic information processing when 
evaluating emails. By teaching individuals how to focus on the overall purpose and 
outcomes associated with emails and withhold quick judgments before allocating 
sufficient attention and time for evaluation, mindfulness training should be more 
effective than rule-based training in protecting individuals from phishing attacks (Baer, 
Smith, & Allen, 2004; Brown et al., 2007; Jensen et al., 2017). Regardless of the type of 
training (e.g., rule-based or mindfulness), however, receiving anti-phishing training 
should help individuals better identify phishing emails and be less vulnerable to falling 
for phishing attacks. Thus, the following two hypotheses were examined:   
Hypothesis 1: Individuals who receive either rule-based training or mindfulness 
training will be a) better at identifying phishing emails and b) less vulnerable to 
phishing attacks in their everyday email use compared to individuals who do not 
receive anti-phishing training. 
Hypothesis 2: Individuals who receive mindfulness training will be a) better at 
identifying phishing emails and b) less vulnerable to phishing attacks in their 
everyday email use compared to individuals who receive rule-based training. 
In addition, very few studies have examined the retention of knowledge and 
skills taught during anti-phishing training, with all studies examining retention intervals 
that are less than 1 month (Alnajim & Munro, 2009; Kumaraguru et al., 2007; 
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Kumaraguru et al., 2009; Mayhorn & Nyeste, 2012). While the retention of knowledge 
and skills from anti-phishing training appear to be robust after these short retention 
intervals, further research is needed to examine how learning from anti-phishing 
training decays over longer retention intervals. Thus, the present study used a 2-month 
retention test interval.  
In relation to the two anti-phishing training methods being compared, it is 
expected that individuals who receive mindfulness training should retain the knowledge 
and skills they gained during training for a longer period of time compared to 
individuals who receive rule-based training. Because mindfulness training teaches 
individuals to engage in the conscious evaluation of emails and elaborate on the cues 
they attend to, this greater depth of processing may result in better identification of 
phishing emails and less vulnerability to phishing attacks over an extended period of 
time (Craik & Lockhart, 1972; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986; Vishwanath et al., 2011). In 
contrast, learning from rule-based training is more superficial and may be more prone to 
decay as individuals only become familiar with the specific guidelines and cues they 
were provided during training. Although Jensen et al. (2017) only examined a 10-day 
retention interval, their findings support the effectiveness of mindfulness training versus 
rule-based training and warrant further investigation. Accordingly, the following 
hypothesis was examined:  
Hypothesis 3: Individuals who receive mindfulness training will have greater 
retention 2 months after training in terms of a) identifying phishing emails and 
b) being less vulnerable to phishing attacks in their everyday email use 
compared to individuals who receive rule-based training.  
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The second goal of the study was to examine the influence of overlearning on 
the two anti-phishing training methods in relation to retention. Because of the severe 
consequences associated with falling for phishing attacks, it is important to examine the 
impact of training strategies such as overlearning that can improve retention from anti-
phishing training, which no studies have examined to my knowledge. Although 
overlearning should reinforce the knowledge and skills gained during training and help 
individuals better identify phishing emails and become less vulnerable to phishing 
attacks, overlearning in the context of anti-phishing training is unique in the sense that 
the task differs across situations. In other words, evaluating emails requires a level of 
generalizability because each email is composed differently. Because conscious effort 
needs to be applied when evaluating emails, overlearning may make individuals overly 
familiar with identifying phishing emails to the extent that they do not treat each email 
differently and thus process emails automatically. In this vein, overlearning may 
negatively impact retention after anti-phishing training over an extended period of time. 
Thus, the following research question was examined: 
Research Question 1: How does overlearning during training affect the a) 
identification of phishing emails and b) vulnerability to phishing attacks 2 
months after training is completed? 
In addition, rule-based and mindfulness training may affect skill retention 
differently as a function of overlearning. Overlearning in the context of rule-based 
training may help individuals grasp the rules and cues associated with phishing emails 
more quickly and lead to better identification of phishing emails and less vulnerability 
to phishing attacks. However, because rule-based training will likely lead to more 
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automatic email evaluation, overlearning may also exacerbate this effect by turning this 
task into a mindless habit more quickly. In this vein, overlearning may also be 
counterproductive to mindfulness training. Because overlearning is intended to increase 
automaticity in responses, this works against the purpose of mindfulness training, which 
is to help individuals allocate more attention and effort when evaluating emails. 
However, overlearning may also strengthen a more mindful approach by reinforcing 
System 2 thinking. Thus, the following research question was examined:   
Research Question 2: Are the effects of overlearning during training on a) the 
identification of phishing emails and b) vulnerability to phishing attacks in 
everyday email use different for rule-based and mindfulness training 2 months 
after training is completed? 
Method 
Participants 
Students at the University of Oklahoma who were enrolled in an introductory 
management information systems course in the Price College of Business were 
recruited to participate in this study in exchange for course credit. A total of 517 
students participated in the study. Of these 517 students, 47 students did not complete 
the second part of the study (i.e., the follow-up survey at Week 10), and an additional 
seven students provided incorrect email addresses which prevented them from receiving 
emails required throughout the study. Ten students were also flagged for having long 
strings of identical responses (i.e., bogus responding). These 64 students were thus 
removed from data analyses, yielding a final sample of 453 participants (55% male, 
45% female). Participants ranged in age from 18 years to 42 years (M = 19.69, SD = 
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1.76). Three hundred and fifty (77.3%) participants reported their ethnicity as 
Caucasian, 30 (6.6%) as Asian, 21 (4.6%) as Native American, 19 (4.2%) as 
Hispanic/Latino, 15 (3.3%) as Black/African American, 4 (0.9%) as Multiple (i.e., two 
or more ethnicities), and 4 (0.9%) as Other. Ten (2.2%) participants did not disclose 
their ethnicity. Phishing also appeared to be relevant to this sample, as 192 (42.4%) 
participants knew of someone who has fallen for a phishing attack, and 28 (6.2%) 
participants indicated that they have personally fallen for a phishing attack themselves.  
General Procedures 
Figure 1 displays the general study procedures. Participants first attended an in-
person training session administered on the computer through the online survey 
platform Qualtrics. After agreeing to participate in the study, participants were 
introduced to the 1-hour training session and told that the purpose of this study was to 
test a new cybersecurity training and help individuals distinguish legitimate from 
phishing emails. Participants first completed a series of Likert-scale measures of the 
covariates related to their email, web, and past phishing experiences, as well as 
personality traits related to these experiences. Participants then received one of three 
trainings (rule-based, mindfulness, or control [i.e., password creation and management] 
training). Afterwards, participants received one of two email identification practice 
sessions (i.e., no overlearning or 100% overlearning) where they read a series of email 
messages and identified whether or not each message is a phishing message. Practice 
sessions differed in terms of how many email messages participants received during 
practice (i.e., six emails for the no overlearning condition and 12 emails for the 100% 
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overlearning condition). The number of practice emails used for each condition was 
determined through pilot testing and previous research (e.g., Jensen et al., 2017). 
After completing the practice session and a filler task (i.e., Big Five personality 
measure), participants completed the first email identification test. Participants then 
completed basic demographic questions and were debriefed about the training they 
received. Finally, participants were reminded that they would be tested throughout the 
semester with mock phishing attacks and would be invited to take a follow-up online 
survey towards the end of the semester to receive additional course credit for their 
participation.  
One week after completing the training session, participants received the first 
test of vulnerability to mock phishing attacks (i.e., first round of mock phishing 
attacks). Eight weeks later, the second test of vulnerability to mock phishing attacks 
(i.e., second round of mock phishing attacks) occurred. After the second test of 
vulnerability to mock phishing attacks occurred, participants were emailed the follow-
up online survey consisting of a second email identification test, reinforcement of 
training to provide anti-phishing training to those in the control training group, and a 
full debrief of the study.  
Training Conditions 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of three training conditions: rule-
based training, mindfulness training, or a control training condition. Training content 
was constructed on Qualtrics and delivered through a series of webpages that included 
text and graphics. Participants worked through the webpages individually, and all 
content for the three training conditions were adapted from materials previously 
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developed by Jensen et al. (2017). Before receiving information specific to their training 
conditions, participants in the rule-based and mindfulness training conditions first 
received the same introductory content that provided background information on what 
phishing is, the current state and recent statistics of phishing attacks, and the 
consequences of being a victim of phishing (see Appendix A). The purpose of this 
introduction was to highlight the importance of the training and motivate participants to 
take the training seriously by making their perceived risk of phishing more salient. 
Participants in the control condition did not receive any information related to phishing 
and were instead provided with training materials regarding how to create and manage 
more secure passwords (see Appendix B).  
The rule-based training content consisted of a list of recommendations derived 
from guidelines from various anti-phishing resources in the academic, governmental, 
non-profit, and corporate sectors. This list was previously presented to information 
technology (IT) security managers at the university to ensure that the material is 
relevant and useful for reducing phishing susceptibility. The list consisted of six 
recommendations that were used as the content for the rule-based training (see 
Appendix C). 
The mindfulness training content consisted of materials that were based on 
previous clinical research on mindfulness and adapted to an anti-phishing context. This 
training approach focused on three key steps: 1) stop, 2) think, and 3) check. In the first 
step, individuals were advised to pause before taking any actions requested in an email 
(e.g., clicking a link, replying to the email, or downloading an attachment). By not 
taking immediate action, individuals can remind themselves of the potential 
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consequences and outcomes of abiding by the email’s request. In the second step, 
individuals were advised to consider four questions (see Appendix D) which asked them 
to reflect upon the actions being requested, the overall context in which the requests 
were received, and the underlying motive behind the sender’s request. Finally, in the 
third step, individuals were encouraged to check with a third-party source (e.g., 
university IT help desk) if they were unsure about the legitimacy of the email. 
Participants who received either rule-based or mindfulness training were also shown 
examples of legitimate and phishing emails, as well as explanations consistent with the 
type of training they received (see Appendix E).  
Overlearning Conditions 
For the email identification practice session, participants were assigned to one of 
two overlearning conditions: no overlearning or 100% overlearning. Although the 
optimal amount of overlearning required is different depending on the type of task, 
there is support suggesting that a minimum of 50% overlearning is beneficial and that 
increases from 100% to 150% do not result in greater retention (Craig, Sternthal, & 
Olshan, 1972; Krueger, 1929; Schendel & Hagman, 1982). Thus, the present study used 
100% overlearning. 
During the email identification practice session, participants in both conditions 
were first provided with the same six emails (three legitimate and three phishing emails; 
see Appendix F). These six emails were displayed in a randomized order. Once 
participants in the no overlearning condition worked through these six email messages, 
they were finished with the email identification practice session. However, participants 
in the 100% overlearning condition were provided with additional practice through an 
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additional six emails to identify (three legitimate and three phishing emails; see 
Appendix G). These additional six emails were also displayed in a randomized order. 
Feedback regarding correct/incorrect answers was provided after each email message 
during the email identification practice session, and explanations for correct answers 
were consistent with the type of training participants received, with the exception of 
those in control condition who did not receive explanations. Feedback provided during 
the email identification practice session is similar to the feedback shown in the example 
legitimate and phishing emails in Appendix E.  
Based on previous performance on an email identification task from Jensen et al. 
(2017), the learning criterion was set to correctly identifying four of the six practice 
emails. Following similar procedures utilized by previous researchers (e.g., Rohrer et 
al., 2005; Rohrer & Taylor, 2006), if participants did not correctly identify four email 
messages, it was assumed that they did not reach a meaningful level of learning. 
Because of this potential confound, supplemental analyses were conducted to compare 
results of the overall sample with a sample excluding participants who did not reach the 
required level of learning.  
Learning Measures 
Emails included in the present study were developed and also derived from 
previous studies (e.g., Jensen et al., 2017). Pilot testing was conducted with 86 students 
enrolled in psychology and management information systems courses to ensure equal 
difficulty across all emails included throughout the study (e.g., the two versions of the 
email identification tests and two versions of the tests of vulnerability to mock phishing 
attacks). Based on recommendations by Myers (2007), emails were designed to be 
30 
applicable and relevant to current university students and were based on actual 
legitimate and phishing emails. For the email identification tests, all links embedded in 
the emails consisted of URLs that redirected participants who clicked on them to either 
legitimate websites associated with the source being portrayed or purchased web 
domains that then redirected participants to legitimate websites associated with the 
source being portrayed. For example, a legitimate email from Netflix included a link to 
the actual Netflix website (e.g., https://www.netflix.com), whereas a phishing email 
from Netflix included a link to a web domain that resembled the actual Netflix website 
(nef1ix.com) and redirected participants to the legitimate Netflix website. For the tests 
of vulnerability to mock phishing attacks, all links embedded in the emails were 
generated by the Wombat Security Education Platform used to distribute the mock 
phishing emails. Although the Wombat Security Education Platform provides 
“teachable moments” and informs individuals that they have fallen for a phishing attack 
if they click on the links, these links were instead designed to redirect participants who 
clicked on them to an error page to reduce suspicion of other mock phishing emails 
being distributed during that timeframe.  
Email identification tests  
Participants completed the first email identification test after completing the 
practice session during the in-person training session. This test was similar to the email 
identification practice session but did not include feedback. The test consisted of 10 
email messages (five phishing and five legitimate) that appeared in a randomized order. 
After 10 weeks (at the conclusion of the second test of vulnerability to mock phishing 
attacks [i.e., second round of mock phishing attacks]), participants received the second 
31 
email identification test, which also included 10 email messages, that was emailed to 
participants through an online survey. These 10 emails were different from those 
included in the first email identification test. The two versions of the email 
identification tests were counterbalanced. In terms of scoring for the email identification 
tests, scores were calculated based on the total number of emails that participants 
correctly identified. Appendices H and I display the emails included in Versions 1 and 2 
of the email identification tests, respectively. The percentage of correct responses in the 
pilot sample was 68% for both Versions 1 and 2 of the email identification tests. 
Mock phishing attacks  
One week after the training session, participants received the first test of 
vulnerability to mock phishing attacks. This test included five mock phishing emails 
sent to participants, which was distributed throughout a 2-week interval to reduce 
suspicion from receiving too many phishing messages within a short time period. Eight 
weeks after the training session, participants received the second test of vulnerability to 
mock phishing attacks, which also included five mock phishing emails. These five 
mock phishing emails were different from the five mock phishing emails included in the 
first test and were also distributed throughout a 2-week interval. The two versions of the 
tests of vulnerability to mock phishing attacks were counterbalanced. Additionally, the 
order of the five mock phishing emails within each test, as well as the dates and times 
they were distributed during the 2-week intervals, were randomized to minimize the 
likelihood of participant interactions related to these emails. In terms of scoring for the 
tests of vulnerability to mock phishing attacks, scores were calculated based on whether 
individuals clicked on the links embedded in the mock phishing emails and then 
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reversed such that higher scores reflected better performance (i.e., less vulnerability). 
All clicks made on the email links were tracked through the Wombat Security 
Education Platform. Appendices J and K display the emails included in Versions 1 and 
2 of the tests of vulnerability to mock phishing attacks, respectively. The percentage of 
correct responses in the pilot sample was 67% and 68% for Versions 1 and 2 of tests of 
vulnerability to mock phishing attacks, respectively. It is important to note that the tests 
of vulnerability to mock phishing attacks were not pilot tested through mock phishing 
attacks; rather, these tests were piloted similarly to the email identification tests by 
having the pilot sample indicate whether or not each message was a phishing message. 
Kumaraguru et al. (2009) outlined a series of issues that should be addressed 
when designing studies that utilize mock phishing attacks in real-world settings, which 
include ensuring that emails sent to participants actually reach their inboxes, 
maintaining participants’ privacy, and coordinating with relevant third parties 
associated with the study. To address these issues, a list of mock phishing emails that 
were used in the study was provided to the university’s information technology (IT) 
department prior to the beginning of the study to ensure that the emails were not 
blocked from the university’s server. In the event that participants contacted the IT 
department regarding the mock phishing emails they received, actions were not taken 
on any participant inquiries or concerns to minimize information regarding the nature of 
the emails from being revealed. When participants received the mock phishing emails, 
they could have responded in one of three ways: 1) opened the email and clicked on the 
embedded link; 2) opened the email but did not click on the embedded link; or 3) did 
not open the email and did not click on the embedded link. Although some participants 
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did not open the emails they received, it is assumed that participants still received and 
saw these emails regardless because these emails were sent to participants’ university-
affiliated email addresses from which they accessed the online survey link containing 
the second email identification test that had to be completed to be included in data 
analyses. In this vein, participants may have still read the emails without actually 
opening them by viewing them in the preview pane within their email clients. 
In addition, because email reading behavior may differ at various periods of 
time (e.g., weekends, late hours), mock phishing emails were not scheduled during 
these times and were only sent during typical work hours (i.e., Monday to Friday, 
9:00am to 5:00pm). In addition, the proposed study received approval from the 
university’s Institutional Review Board (IRB) and thus followed all procedures 
necessary to ensure participants’ privacy throughout the course of the study. 
Participants were informed prior to the beginning of the study that they would be sent 
mock phishing emails throughout the course of the semester to evaluate the 
effectiveness of the training they would receive. Additionally, participants were fully 
debriefed about the study at the conclusion of the study (i.e., after completing the 
second email identification test in the online survey). Oral presentations were also given 
to participants’ classes to provide study results and reinforce the training participants 
received. 
Covariates 
 Based on previous research by Wright and Marett (2010), the following 
variables were included as covariates due to their relationship to phishing susceptibility 
and training efficacy. 
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 Disposition to trust  
Disposition to trust was measured using four items adapted from McKnight, 
Choudhury, and Kacmar’s (2002) scale. Participants were asked to respond on a 7-point 
Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree). An example item was “I 
usually trust people unless they give me a reason not to trust them.” The coefficient 
alpha obtained for this scale was .87. 
Mindfulness in technology  
Mindfulness in technology was measured using four items from Thatcher, 
Wright, Sun, Klein, and Zagenczyk’s (2017) scale. Participants were asked to respond 
on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree). An example item 
was “I am often open to learning new ways of using technology.” The coefficient alpha 
obtained for this scale was .89. 
Perceived Internet risk  
Perceived Internet risk was measured using five items adapted from Malhotra, 
Kim, and Agarwal’s (2004) scale. Participants were asked to respond on a 7-point 
Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree). An example item was “In 
general, it would be risky to give my information to online companies.” The coefficient 
alpha obtained for this scale was .87. 
Computer self-efficacy  
Computer self-efficacy was measured with six items adapted from Compeau and 
Higgin’s (1995) scale. This scale included three items each for internal computer self-
efficacy and external computer self-efficacy. Participants was asked to respond on a 10-
point Likert scale (1 = not at all confident to 10 = totally confident). Example items for 
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internal computer self-efficacy and external computer self-efficacy were “I could 
complete my job using a new software application if there was no one around to tell me 
what to do as I go” and “I could complete the job using a new software application if 
someone showed me how to do it first”, respectively. The coefficient alphas obtained 
for internal and external computer self-efficacy were .86 and .84, respectively. 
Phishing identification expertise  
Phishing experience was measured using three items from Jensen et al. (2017). 
Participants were asked to respond on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree to 7 
= strongly agree). An example item was “I know what a phishing message looks like.” 
The coefficient alpha obtained for this scale was .85. 
Email experience  
Email experience was measured using three items from Jensen et al. (2017). 
Participants were asked to respond on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree to 7 
= strongly agree). An example item was “I can process new emails in my inbox 
rapidly.” The coefficient alpha obtained for this scale was .88. 
Pre-training motivation  
Pre-training motivation was measured using three items adapted from Noe and 
Schmitt’s (1986) scale. Participants responded on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = strongly 
disagree to 7 = strongly agree). An example item was “I am motivated to learn the 
skills emphasized in this training program.” The coefficient alpha obtained for this scale 
was .87. 
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Big Five personality  
Extraversion, conscientiousness, openness to experience, emotional stability, 
and agreeableness were measured using Goldberg’s (1981) 100-item scale. This scale 
included 20 items for each of the five personality constructs. Participants were asked 
how accurately each trait describes them and were asked to respond on a 9-point Likert 
scale (1 = extremely inaccurate to 9 = extremely accurate). Example items for 
extraversion, conscientiousness, openness to experience, emotional stability, and 
agreeableness were “active”, “careful”, “deep”, “relaxed”, and “cooperative”, 
respectively. The coefficient alphas obtained for these extraversion, conscientiousness, 
openness to experience, emotional stability, and agreeableness were .89, .88, .77, .84, 
and .81, respectively.  
 
Results 
Table 1 provides a summary of the results found for the study hypotheses and 
research questions. Table 2 displays the means, standard deviations, reliabilities, and 
correlations for the study variables. Two 3 (training method: rule-based, mindfulness, or 
control training) × 2 (overlearning: 100% overlearning or no overlearning) × 2 (test 
administration: Time 1 and Time 2) mixed-design analyses of covariance (ANCOVAs) 
were conducted ― one for the email identification tests and the other for the tests of 
vulnerability to mock phishing attacks. Tables 3 and 4 display the adjusted means and 
standard errors for the email identification tests and tests of vulnerability to mock 
phishing attacks, respectively. Although all covariates were included in the initial 
analyses, the majority of covariates did not yield statistically significant effects. 
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Additional models that excluded nonsignificant covariates were run and did not yield 
results that would warrant different conclusions. Thus, reported results only included 
tests that included statistically significant covariates.  
Main Effects of Training  
To test Hypotheses 1 and 2, the main effects of training for the scores on the 
email identification tests and tests of vulnerability to mock phishing attacks were 
examined, which included two planned comparisons. As shown in Table 5, there was a 
significant main effect of training for the email identification tests, F(1, 446) = 19.92, p 
< .001, ηp2 = .08. As seen in Figure 2, planned comparisons revealed that individuals 
who received anti-phishing training (i.e., either rule-based training or mindfulness 
training; M = 7.36, SE = .07) had significantly higher mean scores on the email 
identification tests compared to those who did not receive anti-phishing training (i.e., 
control training; M = 6.84, SE = .10, p < .001). Thus, Hypothesis 1a was supported. 
Additionally, individuals who received mindfulness training (M = 7.71, SE = .10) had 
significantly higher mean scores on the email identification tests compared to those who 
received rule-based training (M = 7.04, SE = .10, p < .001). Thus, Hypothesis 2a was 
supported. 
As shown in Table 6 and Figure 3, there was a significant main effect of training 
for the tests of vulnerability to mock phishing attacks, F(1, 447) = 5.17, p < .01, ηp2 = 
.02. Planned comparisons revealed that individuals who received anti-phishing training 
(i.e., either rule-based training or mindfulness training; M = 4.38, SE = .04) did not 
significantly differ in their mean scores on the tests of vulnerability to mock phishing 
attacks compared to those who did not receive anti-phishing training (i.e., control 
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training; M = 4.26, SE = .06, p = .12). Thus, Hypothesis 1b was not supported. 
Although individuals who received rule-based training (M = 4.26, SE = .06) versus the 
control training (M = 4.26, SE = .06) did not differ in their mean scores on the tests of 
vulnerability to mock phishing attacks, individuals who received mindfulness training 
(M = 4.49, SE = .06) had significantly higher mean scores on the tests of vulnerability to 
mock phishing attacks (i.e., were less vulnerable to mock phishing attacks) compared to 
those who received the rule-based or control training (ps < .05). Thus, Hypothesis 2b 
was supported.  
Effects of Training on Retention 
Hypothesis 3 was tested in two ways. First, I examined the training method and 
test administration interaction to examine retention/decay (i.e., changes in scores 
between Time 1 and Time 2). Second, I examined test scores at Time 2 with planned 
comparisons focused on differences between the rule-based and mindfulness training 
conditions to compare the sheer levels of performance 2 months after training.  
As seen in Table 5, there was a significant interaction between training and test 
administration for scores on the email identification tests, F(1, 446) = 4.60, p < .05, ηp2 
= .02. As seen in Figure 2, individuals who received rule-based or mindfulness training 
had significantly lower scores (i.e., decay) on the email identification test at Time 2 
compared to Time 1 (mean difference of -.60 and -.45 for rule-based and mindfulness 
trainings, respectively; ps < .01), whereas individuals who received the control training 
did not have significantly different scores between Time 1 and Time 2 (mean difference 
of .06; p = .70; the scores remained at low levels). Although there was a significant 
change in scores on the email identification tests between Time 1 and Time 2 for 
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individuals who received rule-based and mindfulness training, the change in scores on 
the email identification tests was not different between those that received the two types 
of training. 
In terms of test scores on the email identification test at Time 2, planned 
comparisons revealed that individuals who received mindfulness training (M = 7.48, SE 
= .13) scored significantly higher on the email identification test at Time 2 compared to 
those who received rule-based (M = 6.74, SE = .13, p < .001) or the control training (M 
= 6.87, SE = .13, p < .01, respectively). There was no difference in scores for the email 
identification test at Time 2 between individuals who received rule-based or the control 
training, p = 1.00. Overall, Hypothesis 3a was supported in terms of the sheer level of 
performance on the email identification test 2 months after training between individuals 
that received rule-based versus mindfulness training but not supported in terms of the 
amount of retention/decay across the 2 months. 
As shown in Table 6, there was not a significant interaction between training 
and test administration for the scores on the tests of vulnerability to mock phishing 
attacks, F(1, 446) = .75, p = .47, ηp2 = .00. In other words, as seen in Figure 3, the 
changes in scores on the tests of vulnerability to mock phishing attacks between Time 1 
and Time 2 were not significantly different between those who received rule-based 
(mean difference of -.12) versus mindfulness training (mean difference of -.08). In 
terms of scores on the test of vulnerability to mock phishing attacks at Time 2, planned 
comparisons revealed that individuals who received mindfulness training (M = 4.53, SE 
= .07) did not score significantly higher on the test of vulnerability to mock phishing 
attacks at Time 2 compared to those who received rule-based (M = 4.32, SE = .07, p = 
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.07) or the control training (M = 4.38, SE = .07, p = .35, respectively). Additionally, 
there was no difference in scores for the test of vulnerability to mock phishing attacks at 
Time 2 between individuals who received rule-based or the control training, p = 1.00. 
Overall, Hypothesis 3b was not supported for the sheer level of performance on the test 
of vulnerability to mock phishing attacks 2 months after training or the degree of 
retention/decay on the test of vulnerability to mock phishing attacks across the 2 months 
between individuals that received rule-based versus mindfulness training. Although the 
results for scores at Time 2 did not reach conventional levels of statistical significance 
(p = .09), they were in the predicted direction such that individuals who received 
mindfulness training had higher scores on the test of vulnerability to mock phishing 
attacks at Time 2 than individuals who received either rule-based or the control training.   
Effect of Overlearning on Retention 
Research Question 1 was tested in two ways. First, I examined the overlearning 
and test administration interaction to examine retention/decay (i.e., changes in scores 
between Time 1 and Time 2). Second, I examined test scores at Time 2 to compare the 
sheer levels of performance 2 months after training between the 100% overlearning and 
no overlearning conditions.  
As shown in Table 5, there was not a statistically significant interaction between 
overlearning and test administration on retention for the email identification tests, F(1, 
446) = 1.59, p = .21, ηp2 = .00. In other words, the changes in scores on the email 
identification tests between Time 1 and Time 2 were not significantly different between 
individuals who received 100% overlearning (mean difference of -.46) versus no 
overlearning (mean difference of -.20). Similarly, there was not a significant difference 
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in scores on the email identification test at Time 2 between individuals who received 
100% overlearning (M = 7.04, SE = .10) versus no overlearning (M = 7.02, SE = .11, p 
= .92). 
As shown in Table 6, there was not a statistically significant interaction between 
overlearning and test administration for the scores on the tests of vulnerability to mock 
phishing attacks, F(1, 447) = .74, p = .11, ηp2 = .00. In other words, the changes in 
scores on the tests of vulnerability to mock phishing attacks between Time 1 and Time 
2 were not significantly different between individuals who received 100% overlearning 
(mean difference of .16) versus no overlearning (mean difference of .13). Similarly, 
there was not a significant difference in scores on test of vulnerability to mock phishing 
attacks at Time 2 between individuals who received 100% overlearning (M = 4.47, SE = 
.05) versus no overlearning (M = 4.35, SE = .06, p = .13). 
Although the results showed that receiving 100% overlearning did not result in 
significantly better retention compared to receiving no overlearning, there was a 
significant main effect of overlearning for scores on the tests of vulnerability to mock 
phishing attacks, F(1, 447) = 4.11, p < .05, ηp2 = .01. In other words, as seen in Figure 4, 
individuals who received 100% overlearning (M = 4.41, SE = .05) had significantly 
higher mean scores on both tests of vulnerability to mock phishing attacks on average 
(i.e., were less vulnerable to mock phishing attacks) compared to those who did not 
receive overlearning (M = 4.27, SE = .05). Thus, receiving additional practice may still 
be beneficial in terms of helping individuals become less vulnerable to mock phishing 
emails overall. 
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Effect of Training Method and Overlearning on Retention 
Research Question 2 was tested in two ways. First, I examined the training 
method, overlearning, and test administration interaction to examine retention/decay 
(i.e., changes in scores between Time 1 and Time 2). Second, I examined the training 
method and overlearning interaction at Time 2 to compare sheer levels of performance 
2 months after training.  
As shown in Tables 5 and 6, there were no statistically significant interactions 
between training, overlearning, and test administration for the email identification tests, 
F(1, 446) = 2.33, p = .10, ηp2 = .01, or the tests of vulnerability to mock phishing 
attacks, F(1, 447) = 1.28, p = .28, ηp2 = .01. In other words, the change in scores on the 
email identification tests and tests of vulnerability to mock phishing attacks from Time 
1 to Time 2 were not significantly different between the combinations of training (i.e., 
rule-based or mindfulness) and overlearning (i.e., 100% overlearning and no 
overlearning). Similarly, as shown in Table 8, there were no statistically significant 
interactions between training and overlearning on scores for the email identification 
tests, F(1, 446) = .53, p = .59, ηp2 = .00, or the tests of vulnerability to mock phishing 
attacks, F(1, 447) = 1.43, p = .24, ηp2 = .01, at Time 2. Thus, the results showed that the 
effects of training and overlearning are not dependent upon one another. Put another 




Signal Detection Theory  
In addition to examining the overall scores of the email identification tests, I 
also conducted supplemental analyses to gain insight regarding how training and 
overlearning affected individuals’ capability to detect phishing messages and their 
caution towards phishing by applying Signal Detection Theory (SDT) methods (Green 
& Swets, 1966; Macmillan & Creelman, 2004; Swets, Dawes, & Monahan, 2000). SDT 
is often used in research contexts such as medical decision making and memory 
recognition, and previous researchers have also extended SDT methods to phishing 
detection (Canfield, Fischhoff, & Davis, 2016; Kumaraguru et al., 2010; Sheng et al., 
2007). In general, SDT quantifies the capability to distinguish between signals (stimuli) 
and noise (no stimuli). Within a phishing detection context, signals refer to phishing 
websites, whereas noise refers to legitimate websites. As seen in Figure 5, there are four 
types of responses possible in a phishing detection task: 1) hits (i.e., correctly 
identifying a phishing email as phishing); 2) misses or false negatives (i.e., incorrectly 
identifying a phishing email as legitimate); 3) correct rejections (i.e., correctly 
identifying a legitimate email as legitimate); and 4) false positives (incorrectly 
identifying a legitimate email as phishing). Applying SDT methods is valuable beyond 
examining solely accuracy rates because it accounts for the trade-offs made between hit 
rates and false positive rates. 
Based on these responses, SDT provides a means of estimating two different 
indices: 1) discriminability/sensitivity (d’) and 2) response bias/criterion (c). d’ refers to 
an individual’s capability to tell whether an email is phishing or legitimate such that the 
larger the value of d’, the greater the distance between the means of the signal and noise 
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distributions (see Figure 6; Sheng et al., 2007). In other words, larger values of d’ 
indicate that users have greater discriminability/sensitivity and are able to better 
distinguish between legitimate and phishing emails. On the other hand, c refers to an 
individual’s tendency or willingness to treat an email as phishing. It is important to note 
that c is separate from d’ such that two users may have the same value of d’ (i.e., they 
have the same capability in discriminating between legitimate and phishing emails) but 
may be more or less biased in their responses or the criterion they set for labeling an 
email as phishing. For example, some individuals may be more cautious in their 
responses and thus more likely to label all emails as phishing (i.e., higher hit rates and 
false positives), whereas more vulnerable individuals only label a small number of 
emails as phishing. Negative values of c indicate that users are erring on the side of 
caution (i.e., more likely to label an email as being phishing), whereas positive values of 
c indicate that users are especially vulnerable to phishing (i.e., less likely to label an 
email as being phishing). Overly cautious users are more likely to have higher hit rates 
but also higher false positive rates. On the other hand, other users are more likely to 
have lower false positive rates but also lower hit rates. Ideally, anti-phishing training 
should make users more cautious of phishing in their email evaluations (i.e., result in 
lower, negative values of c), but it should also help users distinguish between legitimate 
and phishing emails (i.e., result in higher values of d’).   
For these supplemental analyses, d’ and c were first calculated using estimates 
of hit rates and false positive rates (see Macmillan and Creelman [1990] for d’ and c 
index calculation formulas). Next, two 3 (training method: rule-based, mindfulness, or 
control training) × 2 (overlearning: 100% overlearning or no overlearning) × 2 (test 
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administration: Time 1 and Time 2) mixed-design ANCOVAs were conducted for d’ 
and c as two additional dependent variables. Tables 7 and 8 display the adjusted means 
and standard errors for d’ and c for the email identification tests at Time 1 and Time 2, 
respectively.   
Effect of training and overlearning on d’  
In general, the effects of training and overlearning on d’ are similar to the effects 
of training and overlearning on scores on the email identification tests. As seen in Table 
9, there was a significant main effect of training on d’, F(1, 446) = 18.45, p < .001, ηp2 = 
.08. The results showed that individuals who received mindfulness training (M = 1.38; 
SE = .06) had significantly greater discriminability between phishing and legitimate 
emails compared to those who received rule-based (M = 1.05; SE = .05) or the control 
training (M = .92; SE = .05; ps < .001). However, individuals who received rule-based 
training did not have significantly different discriminability between phishing and 
legitimate emails compared those who received the control training (p = .32). 
Additionally, there was a significant interaction between training and test 
administration on d’, F(1, 446) = 5.41, p < .01, ηp2 = .02. As seen in Figure 7, 
individuals who received rule-based or mindfulness training had significantly less 
discriminability between legitimate and phishing emails at Time 2 compared to Time 1 
(mean difference of -.34 and -.24 for rule-based and mindfulness trainings, respectively; 
ps < .01), whereas individuals who received the control training did not have 
significantly different discriminability between phishing and legitimate emails between 
Time 1 and Time 2 (mean difference of .05; p = .58). Although there was a significant 
change in d’ on the email identification tests between Time 1 and Time 2 for individuals 
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who received rule-based or mindfulness training, the change in d’ on the email 
identification tests was not different between those that received rule-based versus 
mindfulness training.  
In terms of d’ at Time 2, planned comparisons revealed that individuals who 
received mindfulness training (M = 1.25, SE = .07) had significantly greater 
discriminability between phishing and legitimate emails at Time 2 compared to those 
who received rule-based (M = 8.76, SE = .07, p < .001) or the control training (M = .95, 
SE = .07, p < .01, respectively). Individuals who received rule-based training, however, 
did not differ in their discriminability between phishing and legitimate emails at Time 
compared to those who received the control training, p = 1.00. 
Additionally, there was not a significant main effect of overlearning on d’, F(1, 
446) = 1.30,  p = .25, ηp2 = .00. In other words, individuals who received 100% 
overlearning (M = 1.15; SE = .04) did not differ in their discriminability between 
phishing and legitimate emails compared to those who did not receive overlearning (M 
= 1.08; SE = .04). There was also not a significant interaction between overlearning and 
test administration on d’, F(1, 446) = 1.53, p = .22, ηp2 = .00. In other words, the 
changes in discriminability between phishing and legitimate emails between Time 1 and 
Time 2 were not significantly different between individuals who received 100% 
overlearning (mean difference of -.24) versus no overlearning (mean difference of -.11). 
Similarly, there was not a significant difference in discriminability between phishing 
and legitimate emails at Time 2 between individuals who received 100% overlearning 
(M = 1.03, SE = .05) versus no overlearning (M = 1.02, SE = .06, p = .92). There was 
also not a significant interaction between training, overlearning, and test administration 
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on d’, F(1, 446) = 2.26, p = .11, ηp2 = .01. In other words, the change in d’ from Time 1 
to Time 2 was not significantly different between the combinations of training (i.e., 
rule-based or mindfulness) and overlearning (i.e., 100% overlearning and no 
overlearning).  
Effect of training and overlearning on c 
As seen in Table 10, there was a significant main effect of test administration on 
c, F(1, 447) = 47.20, p = < .001, ηp2 = .10. The results showed that individuals became 
significantly more cautious of phishing in their responses at Time 2 compared to Time 1 
(mean difference of -.18; p < .001). Additionally, there was a significant interaction 
between training and test administration on c, F(1, 447) = 6.70, p = < .01, ηp2 = .03. As 
seen in Figure 8, individuals who received rule-based or the control training were 
significantly more cautious of phishing in their responses at Time 2 compared to Time 1 
(mean difference of -.18 and -.28 for rule-based and the control trainings, respectively; 
ps < .001), whereas individuals who received the mindfulness training did not 
significantly differ in their response bias between Time 1 and Time 2 (mean difference 
of -.05; p = .22). In fact, at Time 2, individuals who received mindfulness training (M = 
-.10, SE = .04) did not differ in their response bias compared to those who received 
rule-based training (M = -.09, SE = .03, p = 1.00) or the control training (M = -.18, SE = 
.04, p = .36) Although there was no change in response bias between Time 1 and Time 
2 for those who received mindfulness training, individuals who received mindfulness 
training were significantly more cautious of phishing in their responses at Time 1 
compared to those who received the rule-based (mean difference of -.14) or the control 
training (mean difference of -.15; ps < .01). Thus, the results showed that individuals 
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who received mindfulness training maintained their level of caution towards phishing 
throughout the 10-week period.  
Additionally, as seen in Figure 9, there was a significant main effect of 
overlearning on c, F(1, 447) = 4.62, p = < .05, ηp2 = .01. The results showed that 
individuals who received 100% overlearning (M = -.07, SE = .02) were significantly 
more cautious of phishing in their responses compared to those who did not receive 
overlearning (M = -.01, SE = .02). However, there was not a significant interaction 
between overlearning and test administration on c, F(1, 446) = 1.53,  p = .22, ηp2 = .00. 
In other words, the changes in caution towards phishing between Time 1 and Time 2 
were not significantly different between individuals who received 100% 
overlearning(mean difference of -.21) versus no overlearning (mean difference of -.14). 
There was also not a significant difference in response bias at Time 2 between 
individuals who received 100% overlearning (M = -.14, SE = .03) versus no 
overlearning (M = -.11, SE = .03, p = .42). Even so, individuals who received 100% 
overlearning (M = .00, SE = .03) were significantly more cautious of phishing at Time 1 
compared to those who did not receive overlearning (M = .10, SE = .03, p < .05). There 
was also not a statistically significant interaction between training, overlearning, and 
test administration c, F(1, 447) = 0.89, p = .41, ηp2 = .00. In other words, the change in c 
from Time 1 to Time 2 was not significantly different between the combinations of 
training (i.e., rule-based or mindfulness) and overlearning (i.e., 100% overlearning and 
no overlearning).  
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Inclusion of “True” Learners  
As mentioned previously, additional analyses were conducted to compare the 
results of the overall sample (N = 453) with the results of the “true” learner sample (N = 
300) that only included those who reached the criterion level of learning of at least four 
correctly identified emails on the practice test. With the exception of non-significant 
main effects of overlearning on the tests of vulnerability to mock phishing attacks and 
on c for the email identification tests (ps > .05), the pattern of effects for the “true” 
learner sample on the remaining tests were of the same or similar magnitudes and 
reached the same or similar levels of significance compared to the overall sample.   
Discussion 
The present study extends the work of Jensen et al. (2017) by comparing the 
effectiveness of rule-based and mindfulness training for a longer retention interval (i.e., 
10 days versus 2 months) and on two tests of skill retention of phishing susceptibility 
(i.e., email identification and mock phishing attack tests). Additionally, this study 
examined overlearning as a potential training strategy to improve skill retention on 
these two tests. The results showed that mindfulness training was significantly more 
beneficial compared to rule-based training in terms of helping individuals discriminate 
between legitimate and phishing emails (d’), become more cautious of phishing (c), and 
become less susceptible to falling for phishing attacks overall. Although the 
discriminability effect of mindfulness training was shown to decay similar in rate to 
rule-based training, the overall effects of mindfulness training were far superior 
compared to those of rule-based training. Overlearning, however, did not improve skill 
retention or help individuals better discriminate between legitimate and phishing emails. 
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It was, however, beneficial in terms of increasing individuals’ caution towards phishing 
and making individuals less susceptible to phishing attacks. In the following sections, I 
review the findings on anti-phishing training (i.e., rule-based and mindfulness training) 
and overlearning on my two tests of skill retention of phishing susceptibility, as well as 
the practical implications of my study. Finally, I discuss limitations of my study and 
avenues for future researchers to consider.  
Anti-Phishing Training on Phishing Identification and Susceptibility   
Previous research has shown that anti-phishing training can be an effective 
strategy for helping individuals learn how to identify phishing emails and become less 
susceptible to phishing attacks (Karumbaiah et al. 2016; Kumaraguru et al., 2007b; 
Sheng et al., 2007; Sheng et al., 2010). However, the majority of these studies have 
relied primarily upon training that follows a rule-based approach that teaches 
individuals how to apply certain rules or attend to various cues associated with phishing 
when they evaluate emails. As phishers become increasingly sophisticated with their 
attack methods that extend beyond these common rules and cues, it is necessary for 
anti-phishing training to also evolve and incorporate content that can help individuals 
apply strategies more broadly when evaluating emails. In this vein, Jensen et al. (2017) 
designed an anti-phishing training program that incorporated mindfulness techniques to 
help individuals better allocate their attention during message evaluation, actively 
question requests made within messages, and forestall action concerning suspicious 
messages. By having individuals think more broadly about the contexts in which they 
receive email messages, mindfulness training can overcome the limitations of rule-
based training.  
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The results of the present study support the initial findings of Jensen et al. 
(2017) by showing beneficial effects of mindfulness training. Specifically, compared to 
those who received rule-based training and the control training, individuals who 
received mindfulness training had significantly higher scores on the email identification 
tests. SDT analyses further elaborate on these results by showing that individuals who 
received mindfulness training were much better at discriminating between legitimate 
and phishing messages compared to those who received rule-based training or the 
control training. The results also show how the benefits of mindfulness training extend 
beyond the lab setting to the field. In other words, individuals who received 
mindfulness training were able to transfer the knowledge and skills they gained from 
training to their everyday email usage, indicated by significantly lower click rates on the 
mock phishing email links compared to those who received rule-based training or the 
control training. Even so, as seen in Figures 2 and 7, the effects of mindfulness training 
in terms of the identification test still appear to decay over time, indicated by 
significantly lower scores at Time 2 compared to Time 1. This decay indicates the need 
for individuals to take refresher courses to retain the knowledge and skills gained from 
mindfulness training. Although this rate of decay is similar to that of rule-based 
training, the change in scores does not undermine the finding that mindfulness training 
is still an effective training method and results in better email discriminability and less 
susceptibility to phishing attacks compared to rule-based training and the control 
training. These findings also indicate that mindfulness training can reduce susceptibility 
to phishing attacks and not at the expense of higher false positive rates (i.e., missing 
legitimate emails by incorrectly labeling them as phishing). In other words, because 
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mindfulness training also resulted in better discriminability, individuals who received 
mindfulness training can protect themselves from phishing attacks without disrupting 
their work productivity by being able to recognize and respond to legitimate emails 
appropriately. 
Although rule-based training resulted in higher scores on the email identification 
test immediately after training, individuals who received rule-based training had similar 
test scores to those who received the control training after the 10-week period. Similar 
to mindfulness training, this finding implies that the benefits of rule-based training are 
short-term and that individuals who receive rule-based training will need to take 
refresher courses to maintain their resistance to phishing attacks. Even so, investing 
these resources into rule-based training may not valuable overall. In general, individuals 
who received rule-based training were no better at discriminating between legitimate 
and phishing emails or becoming less susceptible to phishing attacks compared to those 
who received the control training. Although previous researchers (e.g., Kumaraguru et 
al., 2007b; Sheng et al., 2010) found that receiving anti-phishing training resulted in 
better identification of phishing emails compared to receiving no anti-phishing training, 
Jensen et al. (2017) argued that receiving additional rule-based training may not yield 
additional benefits due to the desensitization of many rules and cues being repeated. For 
example, even without being provided rule-based training, individuals likely already 
know that they should not interact with emails sent from people they do not know and 
should not click on links that look highly suspicious or irrelevant to the email source. 
Thus, receiving rule-based training may not contribute much to one’s existing 
knowledge of rules and cues associated with phishing emails and may even lead to 
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individuals taking the training less seriously and feeling overconfident in their 
capability to identify phishing emails (Kumaraguru et al., 2007b). Rather than using 
resources to implement rule-based training, it may be more advantageous to invest in 
other types of anti-phishing training—mindfulness training in particular—that yield 
more beneficial results.  
Additionally, SDT analyses revealed that individuals who received mindfulness 
training were significantly more cautious to phishing on the email identification test 
immediately after training and maintained this level of caution throughout the 10-week 
period, indicated by similar negative values of c at both Time 1 and Time 2. However, it 
is important to note that individuals who received rule-based training or the control 
training also became significantly more cautious of phishing between Time 1 and Time 
2. This significant change in response bias for the rule-based and control training groups 
may not be due to the training received (or lack thereof) but instead may simply be a 
function of participating in the study. In other words, within the 10-week period, 
participants were exposed to two rounds of mock phishing attacks, with the second 
round occurring 1 week before the second email identification test. This, along with 
other potential threats to internal validity (discussed in the study limitations), may have 
resulted in increased caution towards phishing. Even so, it is important to remember 
that this increase in caution is independent from one’s capability to actually 
discriminate between legitimate and phishing emails. Thus, even though individuals 
who received the rule-based training or control training became more cautious of 
phishing over time, their capability to discriminate between legitimate and phishing 
emails was still significantly lower than individuals who received mindfulness training.   
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Overlearning on Phishing Identification and Susceptibility 
Although previous research has shown that overlearning may be beneficial for 
retention, the majority of studies have only examined overlearning using simple 
laboratory tasks (e.g., verbal recall tasks) and within short retention intervals (e.g., less 
than 1 month; Craig et al., 1972; Krueger, 1929; Postman, 1963; Rohrer et al., 2005). In 
general, these studies found that the effects of overlearning quickly diminish over time 
and may only be beneficial for short-term retention. The present study addressed these 
limitations by examining overlearning with a more complex, real-world task (i.e., email 
identification task) over a longer retention interval (i.e., 2 months). The results showed 
that overlearning does not seem to yield any significant benefits in terms of helping 
individuals better discriminate between legitimate and phishing emails. In other words, 
receiving additional practice during training did not result in better test scores on the 
email identification tests and also did not result in significantly better retention in scores 
across the 10-week period.  
Although these results suggest that overlearning on an email identification task 
may not be needed, receiving additional practice may still be valuable in terms of 
increasing individuals’ caution towards phishing. SDT analyses revealed that 
individuals who received 100% overlearning were much more cautious of phishing 
when taking the email identification tests compared to those who did not receive 
overlearning. This is also consistent with the finding that individuals who received 
100% overlearning scored better on the tests of vulnerability to mock phishing attacks. 
Because individuals who received overlearning were much more cautious of phishing, it 
is not surprising that they were also less likely to fall for phishing emails they received 
55 
throughout the study by erring on the side of caution and not clicking on any email 
links. Although overlearning was useful such that it increased caution towards phishing 
and essentially protected individuals from falling for phishing attacks, being 
increasingly cautious of phishing in and of itself has its own limitations. As stated by 
Kumaraguru et al. (2010), “…good security education should not only increase users’ 
caution towards phishing but also teach them how to distinguish threats from non-
threats” (p. 25). If overlearning only makes individuals more cautious of phishing but 
does not actually help them learn how to discriminate between legitimate and phishing 
emails, individuals will just label all emails they receive as phishing. Although false 
positives are much more favorable than false negatives or misses due to the severe 
consequences associated with falling for phishing attacks, being overly cautious can still 
disrupt individuals’ work productivity if important emails are ignored. 
The results also show that the effects of training do not differ as a function of 
overlearning, which is not too surprising considering how the desired outcomes of anti-
phishing training and overlearning do not align. For example, to better protect 
individuals from phishing attacks, anti-phishing training should aim to promote System 
2 thinking through conscious and deliberate information processing and allocation of 
necessary attention and effort when processing emails (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986; 
Stanovich & West, 2000; Vishwanath et al., 2011). However, overlearning works 
against this goal by promoting System 1 thinking. By providing additional practice and 
feedback on the same task, overlearning can lead to responses that are more automatic 
and require less attentional capacity (Arthur et al., 1998; Wang et al., 2013). Because a 
level of generalizability is required for email evaluation due to the variability in the 
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types of emails received, incorporating overlearning as a retention strategy into anti-
phishing training may not be beneficial (or even logical) because the two strategies have 
competing intentions. In fact, if the intent of anti-phishing training is to better protect 
individuals against phishing attacks, overlearning may actually be counterproductive. In 
general, the effects of training were much more robust compared to the effects of 
overlearning. Thus, rather than focusing on the amount of practice provided during 
training, attention should instead be directed towards providing training—mindfulness 
training for instance—that achieves both goals of better email discriminability and 
increased caution towards phishing. 
Practical Implications 
Within recent years, phishing attacks have become increasingly prevalent and 
problematic. For example, in 2014, the Sony data breach resulted in the theft of an 
estimated 100 terabytes of data and, subsequently, the leak of sensitive employee and 
company information (Alvarez, 2014). Additionally, the 2017 Google Docs phishing 
attack affected an estimated 1 million Gmail users within just 1 hour and demonstrated 
how sophisticated and convincing these attacks have become (Warren, 2017). As 
phishing continues to be an increasingly common issue in society, it seems imperative 
for organizations to implement anti-phishing training to protect their employees and 
their organization as a whole from these devastating attacks. Although it should 
ultimately be the responsibility of individuals to educate themselves about the dangers 
of phishing, it is known that individuals are often overconfident in their capability to 
protect themselves against security-related attacks, are not motivated to learn about 
security, and treat security as a secondary task (Evers, 2006; Kumaraguru et al., 2007; 
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Nielsen, 2004). Thus, this can leave the burden upon organizations to educate their 
employees about the dangers of phishing, especially because they themselves are at risk 
if their employees fall for a phishing attack that compromises the entire organizational 
system. However, despite how contemporary media often only reports major phishing 
attacks or data breaches occurring in organizations, phishing attacks are not just isolated 
to these events. Phishers can and will continue to target individuals across all facets of 
life, which leaves anyone who uses email for personal-, school-, or work-related matters 
at risk of being a victim of a phishing attack. In particular, high school and college 
students are an especially vulnerable age group (Kumaraguru et al., 2009; Sheng et al., 
2010), which implies that academic institutions also need to consider providing anti-
phishing training to their students as well. By training these students early in their 
education, they will not only become more resistant to phishing attacks but will also be 
more prepared in handling phishing emails when they enter the workforce and join their 
respective organizations. In this regard, the broader organizational context in which 
anti-phishing training occurs also needs to be considered to maximize training 
effectiveness (Salas & Cannon-Bowers, 2000; Salas, Tannenbaum, Kraiger, & Smith-
Jentsch, 2012). Because training motivation may likely already be low, it is essential for 
training facilitators, as well as organizational or institutional leaders, to communicate 
the importance and relevance of anti-phishing training to their employees, show 
continued support for the training, and reward good security-related behaviors. A 
broader organizational mindset of cybersecurity will not only motivate individuals to 
take anti-phishing training more seriously but it will also foster a transfer climate that 
will facilitate the use of knowledge and skills gained from anti-phishing training. 
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The results from this study also show that anti-phishing training does not require 
extensive resources to be an effective mechanism in terms of helping individuals learn 
how to discriminate between legitimate and phishing emails and become less 
susceptible to phishing attacks. Rather than distributing security information or notices 
for individuals to read on their own (which has been shown to be ineffective; 
Kumaraguru et al., 2007b), it seems that teaching individuals broadly about what 
phishing is, as well as specific strategies to utilize when evaluating emails (e.g., 
mindfulness techniques), and then providing opportunities for them to practice the skills 
learned and receive feedback can help individuals become more resistant to phishing 
attacks. Because the training was developed with simple slides containing text and 
graphics, organizations and academic institutions can easily implement similar anti-
phishing training programs and reach a large number of employees and students quickly 
and efficiently via internet delivery. 
It is important to note, however, that providing anti-phishing training will not 
eliminate all instances of phishing attacks. Despite receiving either rule-based or 
mindfulness training, 64% of participants still fell for at least one mock phishing email. 
Although clicking on a link within a mock phishing email does not imply that 
individuals would ultimately have given away their personal credentials if prompted on 
a fictitious website, it can still be argued that these individuals are vulnerable to 
phishing attacks by deciding to interact with these email messages. Additionally, it is 
unknown what potentially dangerous content phishers may include within these 
malicious links. As mentioned previously, training is only one strategy for combating 
phishing attacks and should be used in conjunction with better automated tools that 
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filter and warn individuals of these messages to maximize protection against phishing 
attacks (Hong, 2012). For organizations or individuals that do not have the resources for 
or access to advanced technological tools, training becomes especially important to 
defend against phishing attacks.  
Although the results show the beneficial effects of incorporating overlearning 
during training to make individuals more cautious of phishing and, in turn, less likely to 
click on phishing emails, it should be cautioned that individuals must also be trained to 
discriminate between legitimate and phishing emails to not reduce work productivity. 
For example, if individuals are overly cautious to the extent that they are afraid of 
clicking on any links embedded in emails, they may ignore important, time-sensitive 
requests within their emails. In fact, Anandpara, Dingman, Jakobsson, Liu, and 
Roinestad (2007) noted that some anti-phishing educational resources only increase fear 
or concern in phishing and do not help individuals become any better at correctly 
identifying phishing emails. The results do not imply that providing individuals with 
increased practice during training should not be done but instead should be 
complemented with training that allows individuals to learn how to better discriminate 
between legitimate and phishing emails (e.g., mindfulness training).   
Limitations and Future Research 
 There are several limitations that must be considered when interpreting and 
applying the results of the present study. First, the longitudinal nature of the study is 
subject to threats to internal validity such as history effects. For example, participants 
may have learned more about phishing on their own or been exposed to phishing-related 
information during the 10-week period. In this vein, participants likely received other 
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phishing emails that were not connected to the study and essentially had the opportunity 
to practice their email identification skills through their everyday email usage. Although 
all mock phishing emails included in the study were based on real-world examples of 
legitimate and phishing emails and were designed specifically to be relevant to the 
study sample (i.e., all emails came from known university sources or were related to the 
university), some emails may still have been more relevant to some participants versus 
others. Additionally, due to the proximity of participants being in similar classes, it is 
possible that participants across study conditions communicated with one another 
throughout the study to discuss their experiences. For example, although participants 
were not informed of the true nature of the mock phishing emails they received (i.e., 
they were led to an error page if they clicked on the embedded link), it is still possible 
that participants noticed a pattern during the two rounds of mock phishing attacks and 
warned others about these emails. As mentioned previously, individuals who received 
rule-based or the control training may have been more influenced by these effects 
compared to those who received mindfulness training, particularly in terms of caution 
towards phishing. As seen in Figure 8, individuals who received rule-based or the 
control training had a significant increase in caution towards phishing between Time 1 
and Time 2, indicated by their positive values of c at Time 1 and negative values of c at 
Time 2. In fact, at Time 2, the level of caution towards phishing for these two training 
conditions was similar to the level of caution for those who received mindfulness 
training, who already became more cautious of phishing immediately after training and 
retained this level of caution from Time 1 to Time 2. 
61 
 Second, to avoid practice effects and inducing increased levels of suspicion in 
participants regarding mock phishing emails, this study only administered tests at two 
time points (i.e., 1 week and 8 weeks after training for the tests of vulnerability to mock 
phishing attacks; 1 week and 10 weeks after training for the email identification tests). 
Because the study design did not allow for pre-tests to be conducted on the email 
identification tests and tests of vulnerability to mock phishing attacks (i.e., participants 
had to consent to participating in the study before any testing could be conducted), a 
large number of measures (e.g., prior phishing identification experience) were included 
in the study as covariates. However, conducting pre-tests would have provided greater 
insight regarding whether there were actual changes in test scores after training. 
Although the present study does include a longer retention interval compared to other 
studies examining anti-phishing training and overlearning, future research should 
consider extending the length of the experimental window and including additional time 
points. Examining more data points would give a clearer view of anti-phishing training 
skill retention trends or trajectories and provide greater insight regarding optimal time 
points for conducting training interventions (e.g., refresher courses). 
 Third, although Jensen et al. (2017) noted how mindfulness training should be 
supplemental to, rather than independent from, rule-based training, this study did not 
manipulate a combined rule-based and mindfulness training condition. Because rule-
based training is the type of anti-phishing training that is commonly used and is 
assumed to be what most individuals are familiar with, it is not surprising that the 
effects of rule-based training were similar to those of the control training. Thus, future 
research should not only compare the effectiveness of rule-based and mindfulness 
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training as two distinct types of trainings but also include a combined rule-based and 
mindfulness training to determine whether learning rules and cues associated with 
phishing emails, as well as mindfulness techniques to apply when evaluating emails, 
results in even greater protection against phishing attacks.  
 Fourth, the amount of overlearning that was manipulated in this study (i.e., 
100% overlearning) may not be the optimal amount for this type of task. Because no 
prior studies have examined overlearning within the context of anti-phishing training, 
the amount of overlearning used in the present study was determined based on previous 
research on overlearning that utilized other types of tasks. Due to the small effects of 
overlearning found in the present study, it is possible that 100% overlearning was not a 
sufficient amount needed to help individuals better discriminate between legitimate and 
phishing emails. Thus, future research should compare the effectiveness of other 
amounts of overlearning (e.g., 150% and 200% overlearning) to determine if there is an 
optimal amount of overlearning needed to help individuals become less susceptible to 
phishing attacks and retain their knowledge and skills gained from training.  
Finally, this study only examined phishing attacks that requested individuals to 
click on embedded links within the mock phishing emails. Although email links are the 
most commonly used type of phishing method, phishing attacks extend far beyond these 
links and can include other requests such as downloading attachments, entering personal 
credentials onto fictitious websites, or responding to emails with sensitive or 
confidential information. Although the anti-phishing training provided in this study also 
taught individuals to be aware of attack methods beyond links, future research should 
examine the effectiveness of anti-phishing training and overlearning in terms of 
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becoming less susceptible to other types of phishing attacks. In this vein, future research 
should also examine how anti-phishing training and overlearning differs in effectiveness 
as a function of email content. In other words, various phishing influence tactics may be 
more or less effective as a result of anti-phishing training and overlearning. For 
example, some forms of phishing (e.g., spear phishing) are much more customized such 
that they incorporate personal information about the user in the email message or come 
from well-known sources with whom the user interacts, making the message much 
more persuasive compared to generic phishing emails that are mass distributed and are 
often irrelevant or not applicable to all users. 
Conclusion 
In summary, the results of the present study suggest that compared to anti-
phishing training that emphasizes common rules and cues associated with phishing, 
anti-phishing training that incorporates mindfulness techniques is more beneficial in 
terms of helping individuals better discriminate between legitimate and phishing emails, 
become more cautious of phishing, and become less susceptible to phishing attacks. 
Although individuals who received mindfulness training did experience skill decay in 
their capability to discriminate legitimate and phishing emails across a 2-month period, 
these individuals were able to maintain their level of caution towards phishing and 
resistance to phishing attacks. Additionally, the beneficial effects of mindfulness 
training do not differ as a function of overlearning and were found to be much more 
influential compared to the independent effects of overlearning, which only resulted in 
increased caution towards phishing and less susceptibility to phishing attacks. Thus, 
rather than focusing on including additional practice during anti-phishing training, 
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attention should instead be directed towards teaching individuals how to withhold 
immediate judgment or action on email messages, critically evaluate and consider any 
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Figure 1. General study procedures.  
1 Covariate measures included disposition to trust, mindfulness in technology, perceived 
Internet risk, computer self-efficacy, phishing identification expertise, email experience, 
web experience, and pre-training motivation. 
2 Email identification test #1 and #2 (10 emails each) were counterbalanced. 
3 Mock phishing attack test #1 and #2 (five emails each) were counterbalanced and 
distributed over a two-week period. 
4 Email identification test #2 was sent after the conclusion of mock phishing attack test 




Figure 2. Interaction between training and test administration on email identification 





























Figure 3. Effects of training and test administration on mock phishing test scores. 

























Figure 4. Effects of overlearning and test administration on mock phishing test scores. 
























  Signal (Type of Email) 
  Present (Phishing) Absent (Legitimate) 
“Is this a phishing message?” Yes Hit False Positive 
No Miss/False Negative Correct Rejection 
 





Figure 6. Signal detection theory distributions in a phishing detection context. From 
“Anti-phishing phil: The design and evaluation of a game that teaches people not to fall 
for phish,” by S. Sheng, B. Magnien, P. Kumaraguru, A. Acquisti, L. Cranor, J. Hong, 
and E. Nuge, 2007, Proceedings of the 3rd Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security, 
88-99. Copyright (2007) by Steve Sheng. Reprinted with permission. 
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Figure 7. Interaction between training and test administration on d’ (discriminability) 
for email identification tests. Higher scores indicate better performance. Error bars 























Figure 8. Interaction between training and test administration on c (response bias) for 
email identification tests. Negative scores reflect erring on the side of treating emails as 
being phishing (i.e., greater caution towards phishing), whereas positive values reflect 
erring on the side of treating emails as legitimate (i.e., greater vulnerability). Error bars 
























Figure 9. Effects of overlearning and test administration on c (response bias) for email 
identification tests. Negative scores reflect erring on the side of treating emails as being 
phishing (i.e., greater caution towards phishing), whereas positive values reflect erring 
on the side of treating emails as legitimate (i.e., greater vulnerability). Error bars reflect 




















Appendix A: General Phishing Training Content 




• Phishing is a method for stealing personal information, such as usernames and 
passwords, from Internet users by sending electronic messages that imitate or 
“spoof” a valid message 
 
• Criminals use phishing to steal information by sending messages that mimic a 
trustworthy source 
 
• A phisher may send you a message that will ask you to: 
o Open an attachment that will install something harmful on your 
computer 
o Click on a link to a harmful website 
o Reply to a message with your private information 
 
• Phishing attacks can occur through email, instant messaging or texting, and 
social media 
 
• Phishers may use influence techniques to get you to respond by trying to make 
you believe: 
o You and the phisher know each other and are friends 
o Others are responding and you should too 
o The response needed is time-sensitive 








Phishing occurs in three phases: 
  
1. The Bait  
• Phishers send emails to users asking them to click on a link, download or 
open an attachment, or respond to the email  
 
2. The Hook  
• Users click on legitimate-looking websites that are set up only to capture 
sensitive information     
 
3. The Catch 








• Phishing attacks on OU email accounts are at an all-time high 
• More than 70% of phishing attacks are on university staff and students 
• Most phishing attacks try to get information in order to steal from your accounts 
 
Facts 
• If you have an OU email address, you are a target! 
• You probably have already received phishing emails! 
• It is crucial that you understand how to recognize and react to phishing! 
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Appendix B: Password Management Training Content 




• Make it longer by using at least 12 characters 
• Use passphrases (i.e., a string of words), not single passwords 
• Choose three or four words that you can easily remember (e.g., 
horsesloveeatingapples) 








• Always choose a unique password for every sensitive account (e.g., financial or 
work) 
• Never reveal your password to anyone else 
• Periodically change your password for sensitive accounts 
• Do not use the “Remember Password” feature in your browser 
 
If your OU password doesn’t meet the guidelines or if you haven’t changed your 
password in the past year, you should change your password! 
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Option 1: Memorize passwords and don’t keep a password copy for most sensitive 
accounts (financial, work) 
• Ideal for password management 
• Frequent use makes remembering easier 
 
Option 2: Use a password vault to digitally store your passwords with strong 
encrytion 
• Password vault is a software that stores passwords and is accessed by a single, 
long password 
• Secure option for storing passwords to sensitive but rarely used accounts 
• Access depends on remembering your vault password 
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Option 3: Store a physical copy of your password in a secure location 
• Much less secure than memorization or a vault but is a practical compromise for 
less sensitive accounts 
• Example locations: locked cabinet or locked drawer 
• Never leave passwords by your device or in plain view 
 
If you feel your OU password has been compromised, change your password 
immediately by going to accounts.ou.edu. The OU IT Help Desk can be a valuable 
resource by contacting security@ou.edu. 
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Appendix C: Rule-Based Training Content 
To avoid phishing, you need to carefully evaluate emails that you receive and look for 
cues that the email is phishing. If you follow these six simple suggestions, you can 
avoid phishing attacks: 
 
1. Be suspicious of an email or website that asks for sensitive or private 
information 
2. Never click on a link or open an attachment in an email from an unknown 
sender 
3. Do not reply to emails asking for sensitive or private information 
4. Real organizations such as banks or employers will never ask for sensitive or 
private information in an email 
5. Access a website by typing the web address yourself 
6. Hover over the link and look for cues such as ‘https://’ in the address bar (the ‘s’ 
stands for secure) or a lock icon in your browser to distinguish between 




• Phishers want to steal your information and money 
• They try to send emails that look legitimate by using a forged email address, 
adding fake links, and demanding private information 
• They are hoping you overlook cues that give them away 
• If you respond to these emails, if could cost you and OU! 
 
If you have any questions, you can check the OU IT Help Desk at security@ou.edu. 
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Appendix D: Mindfulness Training Content 
Whenever you get an email message that requests you to click on a link, download a 




• Take a few minutes and do not mindlessly and immediately act on an email by 
clicking a link, downloading a file, or replying  
 
2. Think 
• Consider for a moment what the email is requesting and ask yourself these four 
questions: 
o Does the request ask for private or proprietary information? 
o Is the request unexpected or rushed? 
o Does the request make sense? 
o Why would the sender need me to do this? 
 
3. Check 





• Phishers want to steal your information and money 
• They try to send emails that look legitimate by using a forged email address, 
adding fake links, and demanding private information 
• They are hoping you overlook cues that give them away 
• If you respond to these emails, if could cost you and OU! 
 
If you have any questions, you can check the OU IT Help Desk at security@ou.edu. 
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Appendix E: Example Emails with Training Feedback 
From "OU Email Admin" <donotreply@okstateuniversity.edu> 
To: donotreply@okstateuniversity.edu 
Subject: Email Account Update 




Dear OU Student, 
  
Due to migration to a new Open Source Email Collaboration Solution (SunsetGates), it 
is mandatory that you update your OU information immediately by using the update 
link below.  
  
Update here  
 
Failure to update will result in closure of your account. 
 
Thanks for your cooperation! 




Why is this a phishing email? 
 
Feedback for rule-based training condition 
• The sender’s email address is unknown and not from OU 
• The link is not secure and does include ‘https://’ in the URL 
• The link directs you to an unknown website unaffiliated with OU 
 
Feedback for mindfulness training condition 
• STOP and do not immediately click on the link.  
• THINK about the email request. 
o Does the request ask for sensitive or private information? YES! This 
email asks for your private OU information  
o Is the email unexpected or rushed? YES! This email is rushed because 
you need to update your account immediately before it closes.  
o Does the request make sense? NO! This request does not make sense 
because you do not know what SunsetGates is.  
• CHECK with a third-party source (OU Help Desk) before taking action. 
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From "University of Oklahoma" <donotreply@ou.edu> 
To: donotreply@ou.edu 
Subject: Be the First to Know 




Severe Weather Preparation 
Severe weather can develop quickly and unexpectedly during this time of year. We 
want to make sure you are fully prepared to react and respond in such an event.  
 
For more information on OU's emergency preparedness and procedures, please 
visit: https://www.ou.edu/emergencypreparedness/ 
 




Why is this a legitimate email? 
 
Feedback for rule-based training condition 
• The sender’s email address is unknown and not from OU 
• The link is not secure and does include ‘https://’ in the URL 
• The link directs you to an unknown website unaffiliated with OU 
 
Feedback for mindfulness training condition 
• STOP and do not immediately click on the link.  
• THINK about the email request. 
o Does the request ask for sensitive or private information? NO! This 
email does not ask for any private or sensitive information. 
o Is the email unexpected or rushed? NO! This email is not rushed because 
it is not forcing you to view the emergency preparation information.  
o Does the request make sense? YES! This request makes sense and comes 
from an OU-affiliated source.  




Appendix F: Practice Test 
From "OU IT" <ouit@gmail.com> 
To: ouit@gmail.com 
Subject: Upgrade Your Email Storage 




Dear OU Outlook Email User, 
  
We noticed that your mailbox has exceeded the allocated storage limit as set by our 
administrator. You will not be able to send or receive email until you upgrade your 
allocated quota for effective use.   
  




Failure to do this will make your account inactive. 
  
University of Oklahoma Support Team 
640 Parrington Oval, Norman, OK 73019 USA 
Phone: (405)-325-2292 
Copyright ©2017 
All Rights Reserved. 
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From "Microsoft Outlook Support Desk" <update@microsoftoutlook.com> 
To: update@microsoftoutlook.com 
Subject: Server Software Update Required 




We will be performing several software updates on our servers today at 9pm CST (2:00 
GMT). The maintenance is required in order to keep our servers secure and up-to-date. 
  
All users are required to upgrade his/her account automatically by clicking on the admin 
portal URL below to go to the email upgrade page. 
  
Admin Access Portal 
  
Our website, blog, and support forum may be momentarily unavailable around that 
time. We expect only a very short interruption of our form processing service (i.e., a 
few seconds while the web server software is resetting). For security reasons, the 
upgrade portal link will expire within 24 hours. 
  




From: "OU Canvas" <canvas@ou.edu> 
To: noreply@ou.edu 
Subject: Canvas Access: Important Course Error Alert 




We detected something unusual about a recent sign-in to your Canvas account. For 
example, you might be signing in from a new location, device or app. 
  
To keep you safe, we've blocked access to your inbox, contacts list and calendar for that 
sign-in. Please review your recent activity and we'll help you take correct action. To 






From: "Netflix" <info@mailer.netflix.com> 
To: noreply@netflix.com 
Subject: Confirmation of changes to your membership 






Your Price Change 
  
The price for your Standard plan (2 screens at a time + HD) has changed to $9.99. This 
will take effect on your next billing date. 
  
You can review your membership details at any time by visiting Your Account. As 
always, if you have questions, we are happy to help. Please visit the Help Center for 
more information. 
  
- The Netflix Team 
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From: "Dropbox" <no-reply@dropboxmail.com> 
To: noreply@dropboxmail.com 
Subject: Resetting passwords from mid-2012 and earlier 






We’re reaching out to let you know that if you haven’t updated your Dropbox password 
since mid-2012, you’ll be prompted to update it the next time you sign in. This is purely 
a preventative measure, and we’re sorry for the inconvenience. 
  
To learn more about why we’re taking this precaution, please visit this page on our Help 





The Dropbox Team 
  
114 
From "University of Oklahoma" <donotreply@ou.edu> 
To: donotreply@ou.edu 
Subject: OU Alert Account Information 












Be the first to know - enter your text messaging number at accounts.ou.edu. When 
school is closed or there is an emergency on campus, we want you to be the first to 
know! Please visit your account and confirm your cell phone in the "Mobile Phone" 
field to make sure you receive campus notifications. 
  




Appendix G: Overlearning Test 
From "OU IT Services" <ouit@ou.edu> 
To: students@ou.edu 
Subject: OU IT Systems Maintenance  




Hello OU Students, 
  
There will be additional IT maintenance today between 8am – 5pm. During this time, 
some IT systems and applications may be affected, and you may experience brief 
outages. 
  




OU Information Technology 
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From: "Dropbox" <no-reply@dropbox.com> 
To: noreply@dropbox.com 
Subject: Verify your email 






Someone just shared a document with you via Dropbox. We just need to verify your 
email address before you can view/share the received file/folders. You are required to 
sign in with your email address to access your folder. 
  
Verify your email 
  
Thanks! 
- The Dropbox Team 
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From "IT Services" <support@maildeliveryservice.net> 
To: support@maildeliveryservice.net 
Subject: Your Outlook Password Has Expired 
Date: Tue, 28 Feb 2017 11:11:31 +0730 
 
 
Dear Outlook User, 
  
Due to recent suspicious activity, we have temporarily suspended your account.  IT 
Security has implemented additional safeguards to help protect your account when there 
is a possibility that someone other than you tried to sign on. You may be getting this 
message because you signed in from a different location or device. If this is the case, 
your access may be restored when you return to your normal sign on method. As soon 
as possible, please log into your Outlook account from your normal computer.  Click 
below to enter your information and reset your account. 
  






From: "Information Technology" <ouit@ou.edu> 
To: All Students (Norman) <student@ou.edu> 
Subject: Your OU Student Email is Getting an Upgrade! 




Your OU Student Email is Getting an Upgrade! 
  
Good news! Your OU student email is getting a FREE upgrade to Office 365. This new 
offering includes access to the latest Office 365 products, which are already available to 




If you need assistance, please visit askit.ou.edu, call 325-HELP (4357) during normal 
business hours, or email needhelp@ou.edu at any time. 
  
OU Information Technology 
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From "IT HelpDesk Norman" <needhelp@ou.edu> 
To: students@ou.edu 
Subject: D2L Maintenance 




Network Registration Reset 
  
On Monday August 12th, Information Technology will conduct our annual Network 
Registration system reset in anticipation of the upcoming school year. This system is 
used to manage access to the OU network and educate students about the risks of peer-
to-peer file sharing.   
 
 
WHAT THIS MEANS TO YOU 
  
Students will log in to the Network Registration system with their 4+4 and complete the 
copyright tutorial and quiz before registering their devices. You can find instructions on 








From: "IT HelpDesk Norman" <needhelp@ou.edu> 
To: students@ou.edu 
Subject: New Accounts Portal 




New Accounts Portal 
 
Your account information is important for staying connected at the University of 
Oklahoma, and we want to make sure it's easy for you to manage and keep up to date. 
We're excited to share some of the great features on our new Accounts Management 
page that will help you: 
  
• Recover Your Password 
• Receive Emergency Text Messages 
• Update Your Password 
• Select an Email Alias 
  
If you need assistance with any of these items, please call 325-HELP (4357). 
  




Appendix H: Email Identification Test Version 1 
From "OU IT Services" <ouit@ou.edu> 
To: ouit@ou.edu 
Subject: Account Update - Campus Wi-Fi 




Dear OU Student, 
 
Information Technology has detected an error in your device’s campus Wi-Fi 
connection. Any devices used to connect to campus Wi-Fi must be re-registered by 
clicking the link below. 
  
DO NOT DELAY! Unregistered devices will not be permitted to access Wi-Fi. 
  
To ensure continuous Wi-Fi on campus, click here to register your device now. 
  
© Copyright 2017 
OU Information Technology 
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From "Password Reset" <password.reset@ou.edu> 
To: password.reset@ou.edu 
Subject: Password Reset Request 






You have requested that your password be reset. Click the link below. You will be 
taken to the Account Management web page where you can change your password. 
 
> Reset Password < 
 




The Account Team 
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From "OU Webmail Services" <donotreply@ou.edu> 
To: donotreply@ou.edu 
Subject: OU Account - Unknown Login 




Dear Account Owner, 
  
Your e-mail account was logged in today by an unknown IP Address: 103.240.180.228. 
Kindly click	here	and login to validate and verify your e-mail account or your e-mail 
account will be automatically disabled from sending more messages.  
  
We apologize for any inconvenience. 
  
Sincerely, 
University of Oklahoma Webmail Services 
  
© Copyright 2017 
OU Information Technology Center 
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From "OU Bursar" <bursar@ou.edu> 
To: donotreply@ou.edu 
Subject: Mandatory Financial Aid Document 






You have just received a mandatory financial aid document. 
  
You are required to check this now by visiting	bursar.ou.edu. 
  
© University of Oklahoma 2017 
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From: "Dropbox" <no-reply@dropbox.com> 
To: noreply@dropbox.com 
Subject: OU File Share 




OU shared with you an important document using Dropbox. 
 
Click here to view 
  
Sign in to access shared documents. 
 
If you prefer not to receive Dropbox newsletters, please go here. 
Dropbox, Inc., PO Box 77767, San Francisco, CA 94107 
© 2017 Dropbox 
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From: "Google Drive Team" <drive-noreply@google.com> 
To: drive-noreply@google.com 
Subject: Your 33 files stored in Google Docs are now in Google Drive 




We're writing to let you know about important changes to Google Docs. 
  
Google Drive is the new home for Google Docs 
  
This means the 10 files that you own and the 23 files that have been shared with you 
will now be available in Drive, and you can access them anytime here. 
  
You can still do everything you could before, like create, share, and collaborate with 
Google documents, spreadsheets, and presentations. Now, you can access your stuff 
anywhere, find files faster, and work with more web apps. 
  
On behalf of files everywhere,  
The Google Drive Team 
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From "eBay" <ebay@ebay.com> 
To: donotreply@ebay.com 
Subject: Help us protect your account 





It's been more than a year since you last updated your personal info. 
  
Keeping your personal info up to date can help better protect your account. 
  
Sound like a good idea? All you have to do is go to eBay and take a look at your 
personal info to confirm that it's still correct. If you updated your personal info recently, 





The eBay Accounts Team 
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From "OU - Office of the Bursar" <donotreply@ou.edu> 
To: donotreply@ou.edu 
Subject: Update 1098-T Address in oZONE 






You are receiving this e-mail because our records indicate we will be providing you a 
1098-T form for tax year 2015. These forms will be made available online to all 
students by January 31, 2016. Any student who does not specifically opt in to the 
Paperless 1098-T Program will also receive a paper copy of the 1098-T. Paper copies of 
this form will be mailed to the 1098-T Mailing Address on file with the University. In 
addition to providing you with a 1098-T, the University must also provide this form to 
the IRS with an accurate address. Please take a moment to verify that the University has 
an up-to-date 1098-T address for you. This address can be updated in oZONE by 
clicking on the "Update Addresses and Phones" link in the "Personal Information" 
channel, and then selecting the 1098-T Mailing Address from the list of available 
address types. 
  
If you have any questions, please call the Office of the Bursar at (405) 325-3121. 
  
Office of the Bursar 
University of Oklahoma 
1000 Asp Ave., Room 105 
Norman, OK 73019-4071 




From "Learning System Administrator" <noreply@sumtotalsystems.com> 
To: noreply@sumtotalsystems.com 
Subject: University of Oklahoma OnPoint Required Training Enrollment 




Dear OU Student, 
  
You have been assigned Sooner Fire Safety. To access and complete your training, go 
to onpoint.ou.edu	and log in using your OUNet ID. 
  
We strongly recommend completing this course on a device with a wired internet 
connection or stable wi-fi network. 
 
This training course is assigned annually based on your last registration date. If you 
have recently completed this course, to avoid such a quick re-assignment in the future, 
make sure you stay in compliance with the 30-day training window. In the event of a 
fire, every minute counts. Knowing what to do or where to seek fire-fighting equipment 
or help can make the difference between life and death. OU provides fire extinguishers 
in all OU buildings to maximize safety for employees. The federal Occupational Safety 
and Health Administration (OSHA) requires that if an organization provides fire 
extinguishers for employees to use, the employees must be trained on how to properly 
use them. 
 
Questions regarding the Fire Safety training, please contact the Fire Marshal’s office at 
fire@ou.edu. For login questions, please contact your local IT service desk. 
 
OnPoint LMS Administrator 
  
130 
From "OU IT" <ouit@ou.edu> 
To: noreply@ou.edu 
Subject: D2L Maintenance 




OU IT Scheduled Maintenance 
  
OU IT has scheduled a Desire2Learn upgrade from 10:00 PM May 15th until 8:00 
AM January 16th. During this maintenance window, D2L will be unavailable to all 
users on or off campus. It’s important that you do not have any assignments (reading 
assignments, discussions, quizzes, or dropbox items) due during this time.  
 
OU IT technicians will restore service as quickly as possible. Please 
check alerts.ou.edu	for further updates. We apologize for any inconvenience and thank 
you for your patience. 
  
If you need assistance, please call 325-HELP (4357) during normal business hours or 
email needhelp@ou.edu at any time. 
 
OU Information Technology 
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Appendix I: Email Identification Test Version 2 
From: "Netflix" <noreply@netl.com> 
To: noreply@netflix.com 
Subject: You need to update your payment method 






Update Payment Method 
  
We were unable to bill your membership for the current month. To ensure that the 
service will not be interrupted, please update your payment method. 
  
To update your payment method, click: Sign In to Netflix then you will be prompted to 
update your payment method. 
  
- The Netflix Team 
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From "OU Information Technology" <ouit@ou.edu> 
To: noreply@ouit.edu 
Subject: Your OU email was logged in an unrecognized computer 




Unusual activity detected! 
  
We detected something unusual about a recent activity on your account. To help keep 
you safe, we required an extra security challenge. You will need to update your email 
account below to confirm that the recent activity was yours and to regain access and 





• Using a shared computer to access your account. 
• Logging in your Microsoft Outlook account from a blacklisted IP. 
• Not logging off your account after usage. 
• Thanks for using your Microsoft Outlook account to bring the people who matter 
most together in one place. You can change your connection settings anytime and 
find more ways to connect. 
  
See you online, 
OU Online Team 
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From "OU Admin" <MAILER-DAEMON@microsoftsql.net> 
To: MAILER-DAEMON@microsoftsql.net 
Subject: Re: Password Change 
Date: Tue, 21 Feb 2017 09:16:42 +0730 
 
 
Your message did not reach some or all of the recipients.  
 
Subject: Password change! 
Date: Friday, May 26, 2017 11:15am 
  
The email system was unable to deliver the message, but not report a specific reason. 
Check the address and try again. If this still fails, contact your system administrator. 
#5.0.0 smtp; 5.1.0 - Unknown address error 550 5.1.1 unknown or illegal alias: (deliver 
attempts: 3).  
  
Click here if you can't see the text 
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From "Human Resources" <hr@ou.edu> 
To: noreply@ou.edu 
Subject: Important Document 





Dear OU Student, 
  
An important document has been sent to you by the Human Resources Department. 
 
 




University of Oklahoma HR Department 
© 2017 The Regents of the University of Oklahoma. All rights reserved. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: This email and any attachments may contain 
confidential information that is protected by law and is for the sole use of the 
individuals or entities to which it is addressed. If you are not the intended recipient, 
please destroying all copies of the communication and attachments. Further use, 
disclosure, copying, distribution of, or reliance upon the contents of this email and 
attachments is strictly prohibited. 
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From: "OU Canvas" <canvas@ou.edu> 
To: noreply@ou.edu 
Subject: Urgent Course Form 






An important course form has been posted to you on the Canvas Learning System. 
 
Please sign in immediately to view the form. 
 
 




Canvas Learning Notifications 
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From: "Amazon.com" <account-update@amazon.com> 
To: noreply@amazon.com 
Subject: Revision to Your Amazon Account 




Thanks for visiting Amazon! Per your request, we have successfully changed your 
password. 
  
Visit your account to view your orders, make changes to any order that hasn't yet 
entered the shipping process, update your subscriptions, and much more. 
  
Should you need to contact us for any reason, please know that we can give out order 
information only to the name and email address associated with your account. Thanks 
again for shopping with us. 
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From: "Desire2Learn Administrator" <learn@ou.edu> 
To: noreply@ou.edu 
Subject: You have been added to an OU D2L Course 
Date: Mon, 16 Jan 2017 04:52:13 +0730 
 
 
   
This is an automatic message sent because you have been added to CAS ONLINE 
ORIENTATION COURSE at the University of Oklahoma's learning management 
system, OU Desire2Learn (D2L). 
  
If you are receiving this message, it is because someone has added you manually to a 
course or because you self-registered in a course inside OU D2L. 
  
Click here to log in. 
  
If you have problems logging in, please review the "Login Trouble?" area on the front 
page under the login box. 
  
Students: This is not a confirmation of your official enrollment at the University. To 






From: "Apple" <appleid@id.apple.com> 
To: <do_not_reply@apple.com> 
Subject: Your Apple ID password has been reset 




The password for your Apple ID has been successfully reset. 
 
If you didn't make this change or if you believe an unauthorized person has accessed 
your account, go to iforgot.apple.com to reset your password immediately. Then sign in 
to My Apple ID to review and update your security settings. 
 








From: "Hulu" <hulu@hulumail.com> 
To: <hulu@hulumail.com> 
Subject: Notice of Update to Hulu's Terms 






We hope you're enjoying your summer. Here at Hulu, we are continually focused on 
improving our service and the viewer experience. To address some of the changes in 
our services, we've updated our Terms of Use. We want to ensure that we keep you 
informed about our practices, so we encourage you to review the full, updated version 
of our Terms of Use at https://www.hulu.com/terms. 
  
Thank you for being a part of the Hulu community. If you have any questions, please 
feel free to reach out to us at legal@hulu.com. 
  
Sincerely, 
The Hulu Team 
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From "OU - Office of the Bursar" <bursar@ou.edu> 
To: donotreply@ou.edu 
Subject: OU Bursar Statement 




This is an automated message to inform you that a new billing statement has been 
issued and is now available for viewing at the website listed below. Remember, this site 
is available 24 hours a day to make paying your bill more convenient. 
 
Use your username and password to log in to oZONE.ou.edu. Once logged in, click on 
the Money tab and select the View and pay account link. You can pay your bill, 
schedule a payment for a future date, or choose to have future bills paid automatically. 
 
A 1.5% service charge with an APR of 18.00% will accrue on any balance remaining 
after the 21st of each month. 
 
Office of the Bursar 
University of Oklahoma 
1000 Asp Ave., Room 105 
Norman, OK 73019-4071 




















Appendix J: Mock Phishing Test Version 1 
From: "OU IT" <ouit@ou.edu> 
To: noreply@ou.edu 
Subject: OU Email Account Upgrade 
  
Dear OU Staff/Student, 
  
We apologize for any inconvenience caused due to a recent upgrade to the OU website 
and email service. Please log on to your account as soon as possible using your OU ID 
to be sure you have access to your email. This is to ensure that you don't miss out on 
important emails/contacts or lose valuable data. 
  




IT Help Desk 
University of Oklahoma 
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From "University of Oklahoma IT Department" <ouit@ou.edu> 
To: noreply@ou.edu 
Subject: Important Notice 
  
Dear Account User, 
  
Your email ID needs to be upgraded with our F-Secure R-HTK4S new version Anti-
Spam/Anti-Virus/Anti-Spyware 2017. All users are required to verify their account 




We are sorry for any inconvenience caused. 
 
Sincerely, 
University of Oklahoma 
Web Admin Helpdesk 
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From "OU IT Department" <ouit@ou.edu> 
To: donotreply@ou.edu 




Your OU account may have been recently compromised, and your account may be 
suspended in 48 hours. We just need you to review a few details for us, and we would 
get your account running without hassles again. 
  





OU IT Department 
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From "OU Admin" <donotreply@ou.edu> 
To: donotreply@ou.edu 




You have unread messages from the OU Administrative Office. Please kindly click 
here and log in for you to read the messages. 
 
Yours in service,  
Admin Office 
University of Oklahoma 
 
 
This service and the services to which it provides access are for authorized use only. 
Any attempt to gain unauthorized access, or exceed authorized access, to online 
university resources will be pursued, as applicable, under campus codes and state or 
federal law. 
© 2017 University of Oklahoma. All Rights Reserved. 
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From "HR Department" <hr.department@corp-hr.com> 
To: hr.department@corp-hr.com 
Subject: Updated Building Evacuation Plan 
 
The University of Oklahoma is committed to providing the highest level of 
preparedness and emergency response for those working in or visiting our building(s). 
Being prepared starts with reviewing the evacuation plan. 
  
In keeping with this commitment, we have updated our building evacuation plan. It is 
required that you sign in and acknowledge you have read the plan. 
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Appendix K: Mock Phishing Test Version 2 
From: "OU IT" <ouit@ou.edu> 
To: noreply@ou.edu 




We received your request to delete your Outlook account permanently. 
  
Please reconfirm your request to continue using our service. 
  
If no action taken in less than one hour, your account will be permanently deleted on 
our database. 
  
Have a great day!  
©University of Oklahoma 
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From: "OU IT" <ouit@ou.edu> 
To: students@ou.edu 




This is to notify all students and staff members of the University of Oklahoma that we 
are validating active accounts. 
  
Please kindly confirm that your account is still in use by clicking the validation link 
below: 
  




OU IT Help Desk 
Office of Information Technology 
  
Copyright © 2017 
University of Oklahoma 
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From "OU Accounts" <donotreply@ou.edu> 
To: donotreply@ou.edu 
Subject: Review Your OU Information 
 
We are contacting you to remind you that our Account Review Team identified some 
unusual activity to your OU Account. 
 








University of Oklahoma Service Team 
  
149 
From "David L. Boren" <noreply@ou.edu> 
To: noreply@ou.edu 
Subject: Important Announcement from David L. Boren 
 
Good Morning OU Family, 
  









From "University of Oklahoma" <noreply@ou.edu> 
To: noreply@ou.edu 




There is new construction being conducted on campus. We require everyone to read and 
follow the protocol.  
  
Click here to view 
  
Thanks, 
University of Oklahoma 
 
